Essays on Institutions and Development by Jonelis, Andrew
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Theses and Dissertations--Economics Economics 
2019 
Essays on Institutions and Development 
Andrew Jonelis 
University of Kentucky, andrew.jonelis@uky.edu 
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/etd.2019.324 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Jonelis, Andrew, "Essays on Institutions and Development" (2019). Theses and Dissertations--Economics. 
44. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_etds/44 
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Economics by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
STUDENT AGREEMENT: 
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution 
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining 
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s) 
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing 
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be 
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File. 
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and 
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of 
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made 
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies. 
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in 
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to 
register the copyright to my work. 
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE 
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on 
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of 
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all 
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements 
above. 
Andrew Jonelis, Student 
Dr. Jenny Minier, Major Professor 
Dr. Josh Ederington, Director of Graduate Studies 
Essays on Institutions and Development
DISSERTATION
A dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the College of Business and
Economics at the University of
Kentucky
By
Andrew Jonelis
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Jenny Minier, Professor of Economics
Lexington, Kentucky 2019
Copyright c© Andrew Jonelis 2019
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
Essays on Institutions and Development
The essays in this dissertation examine how political institutions affect economic
development. In the first essay, I examine how executive control of the legislature
shapes the time horizon of governing politicians and its effect on economic growth.
The second essay examines how border changes over the past two centuries have
provided different areas within modern countries with different institutional histories
and how this affects the geographic concentration of economic activity. For the final
essay, I examine whether elections have an effect on macroeconomic volatility when
controlling for the democratic nature of the regime.
KEYWORDS: political institutions, economic growth, economic development, exec-
utive control of legislature, border changes, elections
Author’s signature: Andrew Jonelis
Date: July 23, 2019
Essays on Institutions and Development
By
Andrew Jonelis
Director of Dissertation: Jenny Minier
Director of Graduate Studies: Josh Ederington
Date: July 23, 2019
Dedicated to my parents, Bill and Dorene, for all they have done for me
throughout my life.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would first like to thank my advisor, Jenny Minier, for all of the effort and guidance
she provided in helping me write this dissertation. I next would like to thank Ana
Mar̀ıa Herrera and Carlos Lamarche for serving on my dissertation committee and
providing invaluable and exhaustive feedback to help improve this dissertation. I
would also like to thank my outside examiners, Emily Beaulieu and Kristine Hank-
ins, for providing an outside perspective to strengthen my research. Additionally, I
would like to thank all of the professors in the Economics Department in the Gatton
College of Business and Economics for all that I have learned from through classes,
seminars, and workshops. There are many scholars that have helped develop my re-
search through presentations at conferences for the Association for the Study of Re-
ligion, Economics, and Culture, Cliometrics Society, Economics Graduate Students
Conference at Washington University, Kentucky Economics Association, Midwest
Economics Association, Public Choice Society, and Southern Economics Association
that I extend my gratitude for their comments and feedback. Lastly, I would like to
thank my wife, Kaelee Mains, for supporting me throughout this process and always
encouraging me.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Chapter 1 Dissertation Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 Signal of Strength? Executive Control of the Legislature and Growth 4
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Politics and Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Measuring Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Strength and Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 Strength and Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Chapter 3 Borders Change, Institutions Remain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 History and Modern Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Institutions and Borders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Chapter 4 The Effects of Democracy and Elections on Macroeconomic Volatility 66
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.2 Democracy and Elections Effects on Macroeconomic Volatility . . . . 67
4.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Vita . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
iv
LIST OF FIGURES
2.1 Strength and Openness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Strength and Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Strength and Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1 2007 Polish Legislative Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 2014 Romanian Presidential Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.1 Volatility and Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.2 Volatility and Planned vs. Called Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
v
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Executive Control of the Legislature and Replacement . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Executive Control of the Legislature and Economic Growth . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 Executive Control of the Legislature and Degrees of Autocracy and Democ-
racy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.5 Executive Control of the Legislature and Organization of the Government 19
2.6 Executive Control of the Legislature and Legislative Authority . . . . . . 22
2.7 Executive Control of the Legislature and Regime Type . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.8 Executive Control of the Legislature and Investment Rates . . . . . . . . 26
2.9 Executive Control of the Legislature and Government Size . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 Polity IV Variable Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Historical Dates of Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3 Persistence: Initial Institutions and Institutional History . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4 Persistence: Institutional Collapses and Institutional History . . . . . . . 40
3.5 Institutional History and Modern Economic Activity: OLS . . . . . . . . 43
3.6 Institutional History and Modern Economic Activity - IV Initial Institutions 45
3.7 Institutional History and Modern Economic Activity - IV Institutional
Collapses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.8 Institutional History and Modern Economic Activity - IV Initial Institu-
tions and Collapses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.9 Institutional History since 1890 and Modern Economic Activity - IV Initial
Institutions and Collapses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.10 Institutional History since 1925 and Modern Economic Activity - IV Initial
Institutions and Collapses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.11 Institutional History since 1960 and Modern Economic Activity - IV Initial
Institutions and Collapses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.12 Institutional History for Western Europe and Offshoots - IV Initial Insti-
tutions and Collapses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.13 Institutional History for OECD - IV Initial Institutions and Collapses . . 63
4.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
vi
4.2 Democracy, Elections, and Macroeconomic Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3 Presidential vs. Parliamentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4 Close Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.5 Close Elections in Presidential vs. Parliamentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
vii
Chapter 1 Dissertation Overview
This dissertation examines how political institutions affect economic development. I
consider three aspects of economic development across the globe: growth in average
income levels across countries, the geographic concentration of economic activity at
a local level, and macroeconomic volatility across countries. For each of these mea-
sures, I consider how political institutional frameworks and outcomes shape economic
development around the world over time. The first essay examines how the govern-
ing executive’s control of the legislature affects economic growth. The second essay
explores how border changes over the past two hundred years provided neighboring
regions within countries with different institutional histories shaping the geographic
concentration of economic activity. The third essay considers whether called and
planned elections have a differential effect on mitigating or exacerbating macroeco-
nomic volatility beyond the effect of democratic institutions.
In the first chapter, I show that executive control of the legislature is a strong
predictor of whether the governing executive and allies will retain power in the future.
A theoretical model suggests this ability to stay in power would have a nonlinear
relationship with economic growth. At a low probability of replacement, governing
politicians can capture a significant proportion of tax revenues as political rents rather
than using taxes for productive public spending. A high probability of replacement
limits governing politicians time horizon discouraging productive public spending
as they are unlikely to see its future benefits. At an intermediate level, governing
politicians have an extended time horizon encouraging productive public spending
while limiting their ability to capture political rents. Using a dynamic panel model
of 185 countries over a 40 year period, I find empirical evidence supporting this
theoretical model. Economic growth is estimated to be maximized when governing
politicians control 60% to 65% of the legislature. At this level, the executive and
its allies have the ability to pass legislation, but still fear the threat of replacement
which prevents excessive political rents. I also find evidence suggesting this level of
control of the legislature increases investment and limits government consumption.
The second chapter examines how a local area’s institutional history affects its
modern concentration of economic activity. I use night light intensity in 2010 as a
proxy for the concentration of modern economic activity at one degree latitude by
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longitude level for 95% of Earth’s landmass outside of Antarctica. Using a series
of maps along with measures of autocracy and democracy over a two hundred year
period, I construct a measure of institutional history for each one degree latitude
by longitude grid cell. The results suggest that a longer history of more democratic
institutions leads to higher night light intensity today controlling for historical pop-
ulation density, geographic factors, and modern country effects. To account for how
economic and political development occur together, I use the persistence of insti-
tutions as an exogenous source of variation in institutional history. An interesting
pattern emerges when I account for whether a country is on the technological fron-
tier. I find that democratic institutions increase night light intensity for countries
on or close to the technological frontier, while diminishing night light intensity for
countries lagging behind the frontier. This overall effect of democratic institutions ap-
pears to be driven by executive recruitment and constraint. This aligns with previous
research in that institutional constraints limits the risk of expropriation and encour-
ages investment, specialization, and technological progress. The enhanced screening
mechanism of broad executive recruitment may produce better executives and by
constraining those executives increase capital investment, specialization and trade,
as well as technological innovation.
The final chapter considers whether elections, both planned and called for by the
government or a new constitution, affect macroeconomic volatility beyond the effect
of democratic institutions. Calling for new elections may be the result of policy mak-
ers choosing to ride a wave of popular support or could be forced by popular unrest
during economic distress. Planned elections are predetermined and thus built into the
forecast of the future for both policy makers and citizens. This suggests that, while
planned elections can be treated as exogenous, called elections should be treated as
endogenous to current economic performance. Using econometric techniques to ad-
dress the simultaneity between macroeconomic volatility and called elections, I do
not find any significant differential effect of these two different kinds of elections. I
also do not find robust evidence that close elections have an effect on macroeconomic
volatility. I confirm the finding of prior studies that democratic institutions signif-
icantly reduce macroeconomic volatility in a larger sample of countries across more
measures of volatility.
This dissertation examines how different aspects of political institutions have af-
fected economic development across countries over time. The first chapter finds ev-
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idence of a trade-off when increasing executive control of the legislature, in that it
extends the governing politicians’ time horizons while also allowing for greater polit-
ical rents to be captured. The empirical results suggest that a governing executive
whose a party and allies control around 60% to 65% of the legislature would be best
for economic growth as it balances this trade-off. Countries in this range grow around
1 percentage point faster in the short-run and have long-run income levels around 20%
higher than countries that average executive control of the legislature by a standard
deviation higher or lower. The second chapter finds that an area’s institutional history
affects the modern concentration of economic activity, even when controlling for ge-
ographic factors, historical population density, and modern country effects. A longer
history of democratic institutions is found to increase the concentration of economic
activity for countries along or near the technological frontier, while a more autocratic
institutional history benefits countries that lag behind the frontier. The benefits
along the technological frontier appear to be driven by executive recruitment and
constraint. By identifying executives through a screening process that will encourage
investment in capital, specialization and trade, and technological innovation, while
also constraining them from arbitrary action, these areas have developed a high con-
centration of economic activity. The final chapter confirms previous studies in their
finding that democracies experience less macroeconomic volatility than their non-
democratic peers. I do not find substantial evidence that planned or called elections
have any significant or differential effect on volatility when controlling for democratic
institutions. This suggests that political rights are key for limiting macroeconomic
volatility, while the timing of elections is not significant in exacerbating or mitigat-
ing volatility. These essays provide insights into how political institutions and their
outcomes shape economic development in the rate at which countries grow, where
economic activity is located, and how much volatility countries experience.
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Chapter 2 Signal of Strength? Executive Control of the Legislature and
Growth
2.1 Introduction
In 1188, King Alfonso IX of Leon inherited a kingdom in trouble, with the crown’s
resources depleted by his father’s profligacy and facing hostilities from neighboring
Portugal and Castille. The king decided to summon the curia regis, a medieval or-
ganization of aristocrats and bishops, to address the problem. In addition to the
traditional elites, Alfonso IX called for representatives from all the towns throughout
Leon. O’Callaghan (1969) states the king’s “summons to the townsmen was an at-
tempt... to use their support... to establish himself firmly in power.” This gathering
is the earliest known representation of the European parliamentary system. An im-
portant outcome of this cortes for urban entrepreneurs was a guarantee of property
rights and the crown’s justice in return for certain taxes. Since this time, parliaments
and legislatures have served many functions but continually have given a signal of
support for the governing politicians continued reign.
This essay examines whether executive control of the legislature affects economic
growth. The mechanism I investigate is how executive control of the legislature
affects the governing politicians’ hold on power. The probability of retaining power
shapes politicians’ time horizon and willingness to limit current rents for future rents.
Across political systems, governing politicians with a greater share of legislative seats
are more likely to retain power. With a dynamic panel model, I find an intermediate
share of seats boosts economic growth. This implies a greater balance of power
between governing politicians and citizens enhances growth.
Acemoglu (2005) develops a model of economic growth predicting intermediate
strength maximizes output. In the model, governing politicians can either consume
rents today or spend on future productive capacity. Governing politicians face a
probability of replacement decreasing in their strength. Intermediate strength en-
hances growth as governing politicians limit current rents in order to consume future
rents. This in turn leads to greater investment from private citizens as productive
government spending is higher while rents are limited.
This essay uses the share of legislative seats held by governing politicians as a
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proxy for strength. Executive control of the legislature signals strength for governing
politicians across regimes. The composition of legislatures in democracies represents
the support of different party platforms from citizens, while legislatures in autocracies
show control over the political system in limiting opposition voices. Some legislatures
in mixed systems and autocracies include members elected by popular vote and others
appointed by a powerful interest group such as the executive or military.
With a panel of 185 countries over a forty year period, I test whether executive
control of the legislature has a nonlinear relationship with economic growth. As
governing politicians control more of the legislature, the probability of replacement
by other politicians decreases. Controlling for the dynamics of the GDP process, I find
an intermediate share of the legislature controlled by governing politicians enhances
economic growth.
These results show that a greater balance of power between governing politicians
and citizens enhances growth. Increasing executive control of the legislature from
a low share increases governing politicians’ time horizon, while reducing executive
control of the legislature from a high share limits current rents. Intermediate lev-
els of strength discourage excessive rents today without removing the incentive for
productive government spending that raises future rents. I also find evidence that
intermediate strength lowers government consumption and raises investment rates.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows: section 2.2 discusses how political sys-
tems affect economic growth, section 2.3 presents the primary data and sources, sec-
tion 2.4 presents the results for the probability of replacement, section 2.5 presents
the results for economic growth, and section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Politics and Growth
For over two thousand years, philosophers and social scientists have questioned which
form of government would be most beneficial for economic development. Economic
models have produced arguments favoring both the freedom of citizens under democ-
racies in enhancing growth and the authority of leaders under autocracies to stimulate
growth. A theoretical model that does not specify an underlying form of government,
only the probability of replacement that governing politicians face, predicts that
strength has a nonlinear effect on economic growth.
The merits and drawbacks of different political regimes have been debated by
philosophers and social scientists since the time of Aristotle and Plato. Theories
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about the effect of democracy on economic growth suggest a number of compet-
ing hypotheses. Democracies may be better at protecting property rights compared
to a predatory dictatorship, however, autocrats with long time horizons could poten-
tially be more suited towards enacting costly short-term policies for long-term benefit
(Olson (1993)). Democracy may result in more redistribution (Alesina and Rodrik
(1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994)) slowing economic growth, while, alternatively,
democracies could prevent entry barriers from stifling productivity growth (Acemoglu
(2008)). These competing hypotheses argue for different channels on how democracy
would affect growth, while early empirical research initially focused on the aggregate
effect of democracy, recent work has sought to untangle the specific channels through
which democracy could affect growth.
Empirical research about the relationship between forms of government and eco-
nomic development began with Lipset (1959) finding that richer countries tend to
be democratic, while also noting that rising incomes may stimulate democratic re-
forms. Early empirical attempts to uncover the effect on growth such as Barro (1996)
found a weakly negative effect of democracy on economic growth when controlling
for common determinants of growth such as initial incomes and investment in human
capital. Although, Barro finds countries with intermediate levels of democracy may
grow faster. Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) confirmed an overall weakly negative effect
of democracy by investigating the channels through which it affects growth, lowering
inequality and raising human capital but at the cost of discouraging investment in
physical capital. However, Minier (1998) finds countries that undergo democratiza-
tions grow faster than a priori similar countries and democratic reversals resulted in
significantly slower growth.
More recent empirical work takes advantage of econometric tools to estimate
the effect of democracy on economic performance while controlling for the endoge-
nous relationship between political institutions and economic development. Persson
and Tabellini (2007) estimate the effect of democratic transitions and reversals non-
parametrically by accounting for the propensity to democratize, finding a significant
decrease in growth of around 2 percentage points for transitions away from democ-
racy. Acemoglu et al. (2014) estimate the effect of democracy with an Arellano-Bond
estimator to control for the dynamics of GDP leading up to democratizations. They
find a significant increase in growth of slightly under 1 percentage point from democ-
ratization leading to the long-run level of GDP per capita increasing by around 20%.
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In a smaller sample of countries, Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) use both Arellano-Bond
and Blundell-Bond estimators to find that increases in income and education levels
lead to democratic reforms, but find no evidence of the reverse.
This empirical work is motivated by a theoretical model of economic growth and
strength from Acemoglu (2005). The motivating model predicts that the relationship
between the level of output and strength is nonlinear. Strength in the model deter-
mines whether governing politicians remain in power, given tax rates and productive
government spending. If strength is too low, then governing politicians are discour-
aged from productive government spending because they are unsure about whether
they will hold power in the future to consume political rents. Under high strength,
governing politicians are less worried that high tax rates will lower their chance of
retaining control to consume future political rents. The model predicts that strength
is a fundamental determinant of both investment by private economic agents and
productive government spending, thus determining total output.
There are few papers that empirically test different measures of strength on
growth. Bizzarro et al. (2018) use cross-country data on national political parties
such as permanent national party organizations, permanent local party branches,
centralized mechanisms of candidate selection, and legislative cohesion to construct
an index of “party rule” which they find is strongly positively associated with growth.
Bellettini et al. (2013) look at a sample of fully democratic to somewhat democratic
countries and find that long tenured politicians are negatively associated with growth.
Neither of these papers examine the concept of strength described in the theoretical
model that determines the probability of replacement for the governing politicians.
More research has examined the effect of political competition on economic per-
formance. Besley et al. (2010) use variation in independent voters across US states
to examine the effect of political competition on economic performance. They find a
nonlinear effect of political competition on growth which matches the predictions from
their model. Two closely related papers, Ashworth et al. (2006) and Padovano and
Ricciuti (2009), examine the effect of political competition on economic performance
in Flemish and Italian regions, respectively. Padovano and Ricciuti use the 1995
reforms to Italian regional elections as an exogenous source of variation in political
competition and confirm the results of Besley et al. for the regions of Italy. Ashworth
et al. examine the efficiency of government spending on public goods and find that
an increased number of parties contesting an election leads to greater efficiency.
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So far, no research has examined the effect of strength as measured by executive
control of the legislature. In the next section, I discuss the primary data sources
and how executive control of the legislature varies across political openness. I then
show this proxy for strength has a large effect on the probability of replacement even
when controlling for economic conditions. With this measure of strength predicting
replacement, I confirm that executive control of the legislature has a nonlinear effect
on economic growth when controlling for the dynamics of the GDP process.
2.3 Measuring Strength
Executive control of the legislature is used as a proxy for strength that corresponds to
the probability of replacement in the theoretical model. I measure executive control
of the legislature, Strengthi,t, by the share of seats held by the governing coalition
in the lower house of the legislature in country i at time t. The governing coalition
includes parties that form the government in parliamentary systems and the party of
the president and allies in presidential systems. These data come from the Database
of Political Institutions (DPI), originally constructed by researchers at the World
Bank and recently updated by researchers at the Inter-American Development Bank
(Cesi Cruz (2016)). I added a number of countries to this data set using a series
of reference books by Nohlen and co-authors (Nohlen et al. (1999, 2001a, 2001b),
Nohlen (2005a, 2005b), and Nohlen and Stöver (2010)) which present election results
world-wide. Data were cross-referenced against official government websites where
available to ensure accuracy.
Summary statistics for executive control of the legislature and other variables used
are provided in Table 2.1 below. As is standard in growth regressions, the economic
variables come from the latest edition of the Penn World Tables from Feenstra et al.
(2015). Additionally, I also include measures of autocracy and democracy from Mar-
shall and Jaggers (2002) to determine whether Strength is capturing information
other than the degree of political openness.
Figure 2.1 shows how the distribution of Strength changes with the Polity score,
which is the degree of democracy less the degree of autocracy ranging from -10 to
10. The center line in each box gives the median Strength while the box represents
the middle 50% of the distribution. Although there is a downward trend in median
Strength as the Polity score increases, there is substantial variation in Strength
at each Polity Score. This suggests that although a country may have a more open
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Countries
Strength 0.683 0.211 5914 185
Log GDP pc 8.824 1.212 5914 185
Growth 0.023 0.085 5914 185
Investment Rate 0.226 0.239 5914 185
Government Size 0.207 0.171 5914 185
Population Growth 0.016 0.016 5914 185
Polity Score 2.807 7.021 4848 154
Autocracy Score 2.405 3.18 4848 154
Democracy Score 5.212 4.05 4848 154
Figure 2.1: Strength and Openness
This figure illustrates how the distribution of Strength varies across Polity score. The box provides
the middle 50 percent of the distribution with the line in the center indicating the median.
9
political system (higher Polity score) the share of seats held by the governing coalition
may be high, and, conversely governing politicians in closed political systems (low
Polity score) may only control an intermediate share of the legislature.
2.4 Strength and Replacement
I confirm that executive control of the legislature captures the motivating model’s
probability of replacement using linear probability (LPM) and logit models. I esti-
mate regressions of the following form:
Replacementi,t = f(ηStrengthi,t +X
′
i,tβ + ui + vt + εi,t)
where Replacementi,t is an indicator variable for whether there is a new governing
executive party relative to the previous year, Xi,t controls for level of GDP per capita
and growth rate. I find Strength significantly reduces the probability of replacement
across both LPM and Logit models in Table 2.2 below.
Before any econometric analysis, Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between the
average Strength for each country and the average replacement rate of the gov-
erning executive party. As average Strength increases, the average probability of
replacement for the governing executive party decreases. This pattern holds across
geographic regions as well, suggesting it is not only a phenomenon in the democra-
cies of North America and Western Europe, but also holds in Africa, Asia, Eastern
Europe, Latin America, and Oceania.
The magnitude of the effect of Strength on replacement is remarkably consis-
tent and statistically significant across both specifications. The LPM in Table 2.2
estimates that increasing Strength by one within-country standard deviation (15
percentage points) reduces the probability of replacement by 19.46% from the mean
replacement rate of 11%. In the Logit model, I lose nineteen countries from the
sample because over the sample period there are no observed changes in the politi-
cal party of the governing executive. A within-country standard deviation increase in
Strength is estimated to reduce the probability of replacement by 19.15% in the Logit
model. This is a substantial decrease in the probability of replacement for governing
politicians as Strength increases.
Economic conditions would have to alter drastically to have a similar effect as
a within-country standard deviation increase in Strength. Both income levels and
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Figure 2.2: Strength and Replacement
This figure plots the average replacement rate by country against the average Strength by country.
Table 2.2: Executive Control of the Legislature and Replacement
LPM Logit
Strength -0.143*** -1.272***
(0.032) (0.297)
Log GDP per capita -0.015 -0.246
(0.011) (0.159)
GDP per capita growth -0.091** -0.883*
(0.045) (0.472)
Observations 5,914 5,343
Countries 185 166
Time Trend Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses are
clustered at the country level for Linear Probability Model
and bootstrapped for Logit. *, **, and *** indicate statisti-
cal significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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growth are estimated to decrease the probability of replacement for the governing ex-
ecutive party, however, log GDP per capita is not found to be significant at standard
levels. The LPM estimates that a 143.5% increase in GDP per capita is estimated to
have the same effect as increasing Strength one within-country standard deviation,
while the Logit model estimates a 77.8% increase would have a similar effect as the
increase in Strength. Although long-run income levels do not have a significant effect
on replacement, growth in the short run is estimated to significantly reduce replace-
ment for the governing executive party. Under the LPM, a 23.7 percentage point
increase in growth is estimated to have the same effect as a within-country standard
deviation increase in Strength. The Logit model estimates that it would take a 21.7
percentage point increase in growth to reduce the probability of replacement by a
similar amount as the increase in Strength.
These results confirm that executive control of the legislature is an appropriate
proxy in capturing the probability of replacement in the motivating model. While
economic conditions do affect the probability of replacement, Strength is a major
determinant that is observed by governing politicians and citizens in real time. In
the next section, I go on to test whether there is a nonlinear relationship between
Strength and economic growth.
2.5 Strength and Growth
Section 4 produced results showing Strength has a significant and large effect on
reducing the probability of replacement for the governing executive party. From
the motivating model, an intermediate level of Strength would enhance economic
growth, while high and low levels would slow growth. In this section, I examine the
relationship between Strength and growth, controlling for the potential endogenous
relationship with a dynamic panel model and instrumental variables strategy.
Exogenous variation in Strength is identified by lagged indicators of the voting
system for the legislature. I instrument for the linear and squared terms of Strength
with the lag of Strength and lagged indicators for proportional representation and
plurality voting. Proportional representation voting is a system where there are
nation or region wide elections between political parties and each political party is
allocated seats in the legislature according to the share of votes received. This system
allows smaller political parties into the legislature leading to lower Strength (corr.
= −0.2926, p < 0.001, see Rae (1967), Shugart and Taagepera (1989), Lijphart
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(1990) and Lijphart et al. (1994)). Plurality voting is a system where a number of
politicians compete to represent the same constituency and the politician that receives
the most votes gains the seat. This system limits the entry of smaller political parties
into the legislature leading to higher Strength (corr. = 0.0991, p < 0.001). The
tables below provide tests of both under and over identification of Strength. The
Anderson LR statistic consistently rejects the null of under identification at a 1%
level, providing evidence of strong correlation between the instruments and current
Strength. Additionally, when enough lags of GDP per capita are included, I do not
find evidence of over identification as the instruments are not significantly correlated
with the error term. In the main results, the Hansen J-statistic provides evidence
that the instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
The regression equation takes the following form:
yi,t =
T∑
s=1
ρsyi,t−s +X
′
i,tβ + γ1Strengthi,t + γ2Strength
2
i,t + ui + vt + εi,t
where yi,t is log GDP per capita in country i and year t, Xi,t controls for investment
in physical capital, population growth, and the share of government consumption in
GDP. Strengthi,t is the share of seats held by governing politicians which was shown
to predict the probability of replacement in the previous section. ui controls for
country fixed effects, vt controls for year effects, and εi,t represents the random error
term.
Table 2.3 presents the main results for this essay by estimating the effect of
Strength with a two-stage least squares dynamic panel estimator controlling for up
to four lags of GDP per capita. The estimated relationship between Strength and
economic growth matches the motivating model as both the coefficients on the linear
and squared term are statistically significant. Intermediate levels of Strength are
estimated to enhance growth given the underlying political regime, while high and
low levels of Strength would slow growth.
The table includes both the test-statistics for the Anderson test of under identi-
fication and Hansen test of over identification. I consistently reject the null of under
identification at p < 0.001 providing evidence that the instruments explain a sig-
nificant amount of variation in current Strength. In specification 1 of Table 2.3,
I reject the null of the Hansen test at p < 0.1 signifying that the instruments are
somewhat correlated with the error term, however, as more lags of GDP per capita
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Table 2.3: Executive Control of the Legislature and Economic Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strength 0.770*** 0.681*** 0.656*** 0.611**
(0.251) (0.247) (0.245) (0.243)
Strength2 -0.588*** -0.520*** -0.505*** -0.468***
(0.186) (0.183) (0.183) (0.181)
Investment 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.031*** 0.032***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Government Size -0.075*** -0.069*** -0.054*** -0.055***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Population growth 0.055 0.010 -0.026 -0.014
(0.191) (0.191) (0.194) (0.201)
Log GDP pc (t− 1) 0.947*** 1.087*** 1.091*** 1.086***
(0.008) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
Log GDP pc (t− 2) -0.145*** -0.077* -0.086*
(0.032) (0.044) (0.046)
Log GDP pc (t− 3) -0.070*** -0.005
(0.026) (0.037)
Log GDP pc (t− 4) -0.053**
(0.022)
Optimal Strength 0.655 0.654 0.650 0.653
[0.634,0.676] [0.631,0.677] [0.624,0.675] [0.627,0.678]
Observations 5770 5666 5543 5416
Countries 185 185 185 185
Anderson LR-stat 213.919 213.365 216.200 219.533
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-stat 2.809 2.027 2.357 2.212
p-value 0.094 0.155 0.125 0.137
Country and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Robust standard errors reported in
the parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Optimal Strength levels are calculated with the
Delta method and 95% confidence interval presented in brackets. The null for the Anderson test
is that the first-stage regressions are under identified, i.e. instruments are not correlated with
the endogenous regressors. The null for the Hansen test is that the excluded instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term, i.e. instruments are exogenous.
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are included the p-value increases. This suggests that after including enough lags of
GDP per capita, the instruments provide a source of exogenous variation in Strength.
I believe this is due to more lags of GDP per capita accounting for how economic
performance during political cycles affects Strength.
Optimal Strength for boosting economic growth is consistently estimated across
all four specifications of Table 2.3 at 65% of seats held by governing politicians. The
95% confidence interval for Strength is estimated to be between 62% and 68% of the
legislature held by governing politicians. Shifting executive control of the legislature
to optimal Strength by a within-country standard deviation (15 percentage points)
is estimated to increase GDP per capita growth by 1.03 percentage points in my
preferred specification including four lags of GDP per capita. This is my preferred
specification as it controls for the economic performance between the average election
cycle and how that may affect Strength. A permanent shift in Strength to the
optimal level is estimated to increase GDP per capita by 17.74% in the long run
( 1.03∑T
s=1
ρ̂s
) accounting for persistence in the GDP process.
Figure 2.3: Strength and Growth
This figure plots the average residual by country from specification 4 of Table 2.3 after controlling
for all covariates besides Strength against the average Strength by country. The dashed lines
provide the 95% confidence interval for optimal Strength.
Figure 2.3 shows the average amount of growth explained by a country’s average
Strength. The vertical axis is the average amount of growth after controlling for all
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other covariates, including country and year effects, besides Strength from specifica-
tion 4 of Table 2.3. While there is variation across all levels of Strength, the nonlinear
relationship is evident. Countries that have averaged low or high Strength have un-
derperformed relative to intermediate Strength controlling for other determinants of
economic growth. This relationship holds across regions as well. Many countries in
the Americas and Europe have average Strength approaching the estimated optimal
level, while neighboring countries at much higher levels have worse growth perfor-
mances. The majority of countries in Africa have average Strength exceeding the
optimal level, but most in the region of the optimal level have had better growth
performances. The variation in average Strength across Asian countries shows the
overall nonlinear relationship. The countries in Asia with high average Strength
and the few with low average Strength both under performed their neighbors with
intermediate Strength.
The effect of Strength is robust to controlling for the autocratic or democratic
nature of the regime. Table 2.4 presents results when including the measures of
autocracy and democracy from Marshall and Jaggers (2002) as additional endoge-
nous regressors. Lags of the measures for autocracy and democracy are used as an
additional instrument in these regressions. The main results are largely unchanged
by including measures of political openness in that intermediate levels of Strength
enhance growth. Throughout Table 2.4, I consistently find that the endogenous
variables are not under identified. However, introducing measures of autocracy and
democracy leads to the endogenous variables being correlated with the error term.
This suggests that lags of autocracy and democracy are not strictly exogenous from
current economic performance.
Specification 1 of Table 2.4 introduces the autocracy score from the Polity IV data
set. The nonlinear relationship between Strength and growth is still significant with
coefficient estimates even larger in magnitude than the preferred specification from
Table 2.3. The estimated optimal Strength is estimated at 63.3% of the legislature
with a 95% confidence interval from 61.3% to 65.4%. I find the effect of greater
autocracy to be significant and positive. For each one point increase in autocracy,
the estimated growth rate increases 0.7 percentage points, although this only will
somewhat offset the likely associated increase in Strength away from the optimal
level. Shifting executive control of the legislature to optimal Strength by a within-
country standard deviation is estimated to increase growth by 1.65 percentage points
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Table 2.4: Executive Control of the Legislature and Degrees of Autocracy and Democ-
racy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strength 0.918*** 0.764*** 0.885*** 0.852***
(0.291) (0.245) (0.286) (0.269)
Strength2 -0.725*** -0.593*** -0.697*** -0.668***
(0.224) (0.186) (0.220) (0.207)
Autocracy Score 0.007*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.003)
Democracy Score -0.003** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002)
Polity Score -0.003***
(0.001)
Log GDP pc (t− 1) 1.079*** 1.081*** 1.080*** 1.080***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Log GDP pc (t− 2) -0.083 -0.081 -0.083 -0.083
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Log GDP pc (t− 3) 0.036 0.033 0.035 0.035
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Log GDP pc (t− 4) -0.088*** -0.084*** -0.091*** -0.085***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Optimal Strength 0.633 0.645 0.635 0.638
[0.613,0.654] [0.622,0.668] [0.613,0.656] [0.616,0.659]
Observations 4406 4406 4406 4406
Countries 154 154 154 154
Anderson LR-stat 103.217 145.122 103.012 121.082
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-stat 4.018 3.174 4.971 3.353
p-value 0.045 0.075 0.026 0.067
Country and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Additional covariates include gov-
ernment consumption, investment rates, and population growth. Optimal Strength levels are
calculated with the Delta method and 95% confidence interval presented in brackets. Robust
standard errors reported in the parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The null for the
Anderson test is that the first-stage regressions are under identified, i.e. instruments are not
correlated with the endogenous regressors. The null for the Hansen test is that the excluded
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, i.e. instruments are exogenous.
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and a long-run increase of 29.38% in GDP per capita.
I next introduce the democracy score from Polity IV in specification 2. The es-
timated coefficients on the linear and squared Strength terms are more in line with
my preferred specification from Table 2.3. Additionally, the optimal Strength is esti-
mated close to the level from the preferred specification at 64.5% and a 95% confidence
interval ranging from 62.2% to 66.8%. The effect of greater democracy is estimated
to be negative with a one point increase decreasing the estimated growth rate by
0.3 percentage points. Shifting executive control of the legislature by one within-
country standard deviation to optimal Strength is estimated to increase growth by
1.33 percentage points and a long-run increase in GDP per capita of 23.73%.
Specification 3 of Table 2.4 includes both measures of autocracy and democracy.
Here the coefficient estimates are both positive and significant suggesting that more
consolidated autocracies and democracies experience faster growth than regimes in
flux. A one point increase in autocracy is estimated to increase growth by 1.1 percent-
age points, while a one point increase in democracy is estimated to increase growth
by 0.4 percentage points. The estimated optimal Strength remains remarkably close
to the preferred specification at 63.5% with a 95% confidence interval ranging from
61.3% to 65.6%. Shifting executive control of the legislature a within-country stan-
dard deviation to optimal Strength is estimated to increase growth by 1.58 percentage
points and a long-run increase of 26.27% in GDP per capita.
The last specification of Table 2.4 includes the Polity score which is the democracy
score less autocracy score. Here, I find that a greater degree of political openness is
estimated to decrease growth at 0.3 percentage points for each one point increase
in the Polity score. Estimated optimal Strength is nearly unchanged at 63.8% with
a 95% confidence interval ranging form 61.6% to 65.9%. A within-country standard
deviation shift in executive control of the legislature to optimal Strength is estimated
to increase growth by 1.51 percentage points and a long-run increase of 28.45% in
GDP per capita.
The effect of Strength is also robust to controlling for the organization of the
government. Table 2.5 presents results when including an indicator for bicameral
legislatures, federal and presidential systems. The main results are unchanged by
including indicators for how the government is organized so that intermediate levels
of Strength enhance growth.
Specification 1 of Table 2.5 introduces an indicator for bicameral legislatures which
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Table 2.5: Executive Control of the Legislature and Organization of the Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strength 0.640*** 0.590** 0.616** 0.626**
(0.247) (0.243) (0.243) (0.249)
Strength2 -0.492*** -0.452** -0.472*** -0.481***
(0.184) (0.181) (0.181) (0.186)
Bicameral -0.045** -0.045**
(0.022) (0.022)
Federal 0.015 0.015
(0.022) (0.022)
Presidential 0.001 0.002
(0.009) (0.009)
Log GDP pc (t− 1) 1.086*** 1.086*** 1.086*** 1.085***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Log GDP pc (t− 2) -0.086* -0.086* -0.086* -0.086*
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Log GDP pc (t− 3) -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Log GDP pc (t− 4) -0.052** -0.053** -0.053** -0.052**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Optimal Strength 0.651 0.653 0.653 0.652
[0.626,0.676] [0.626,0.679] [0.628,0.678] [0.626,0.677]
Observations 5416 5416 5416 5416
Countries 185 185 185 185
Anderson LR stat 209.220 203.689 216.603 198.339
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-stat 2.119 2.094 2.245 2.067
p-value 0.146 0.148 0.134 0.151
Country and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Additional covariates include gov-
ernment consumption, investment rates, and population growth. Optimal Strength levels are
calculated with the Delta method and 95% confidence interval presented in brackets. Robust
standard errors reported in the parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The null for the
Anderson test is that the first-stage regressions are under identified, i.e. instruments are not
correlated with the endogenous regressors. The null for the Hansen test is that the excluded
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, i.e. instruments are exogenous.
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is instrumented with a lagged indicator for bicameral legislatures. The effect of a
bicameral legislature is estimated to significantly reduce growth by 4.5 percentage
points, however, it should be noted that this is estimated from only two countries in
the sample (Peru and Venezuela) moving from a bicameral to unicameral legislature.
The coefficients on Strength are consistently estimated near the preferred specifica-
tion from Table 2.3. Optimal Strength is estimated at 65.1% of the legislature held
by governing politicians with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 62.6% to 67.6%.
Shifting executive control of the legislature by a within-country standard deviation
to optimal Strength is estimated to increase growth by 1.05 percentage points and a
long-run increase of 18.17% in GDP per capita.
For specification 2 of Table 2.5, I include an indicator for federal systems instru-
mented with a lagged indicator for federal systems. The estimated effect of federal
systems is positive, however not significant at standard levels. The coefficients on
Strength are similar to the preferred specification in Table 2.3. The estimated op-
timal level is 65.3% with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 62.6% to 67.9%.
Shifting executive control of the legislature to the estimated optimal Strength level
by a within-country standard deviation is estimated to boost growth by 1.01 percent-
age points and a long-run increase of 17.42%.
In specification 3 of Table 2.5, I introduce an indicator for presidential systems
which is instrumented with a lagged indicator for presidential systems. I do not find
any significant effect from presidential systems on growth and the estimated coeffi-
cient is close to zero. The coefficients on Strength are estimated near the preferred
specification from Table 2.3. Optimal Strength is estimated at 65.3% of the legisla-
ture held by governing politicians with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 62.8%
to 67.8%. Shifting executive control of the legislature by a within-country standard
deviation to optimal Strength is estimated to increase growth by 1.06 percentage
points and a long-run increase of 18.33% in GDP per capita. Specification 4 controls
for bicameral legislatures, federal and presidential systems. The estimated coefficients
and optimal Strength are in line with the previous three specifications.
Legislative Authority
Parliaments vary in their level of authority around the world, ranging from the strong
parliaments seen in Western Europe to so-called “rubber-stamp” congresses of one-
party states or monarchies. Fish and Kroenig (2009) develop a Parliamentary Power
20
Index (PPI) that measures the number of potential functions a legislature could hold
such as checks on the executive, influence over policy, and institutional autonomy.
Using the PPI to separate countries between strong and weak parliaments, I find
intermediate levels of Strength enhance growth in legislatures that are not relatively
limited in their powers.
The PPI ranks the legislative branches for over 150 countries on the legislature’s
specific powers in a few broad categories. The thirty-two indicators for legislative
powers fall into the categories of influence over the executive, specified powers over
policy, and institutional autonomy and capacity. Legislatures with greater influence
over the executive are able to replace the executive and confirm appointments to
ministerial posts. When the parliament has authority over judicial or central bank
appointments, as well as the authority to declare war and ratify treaties, then it has
greater specified powers over policy. Institutional autonomy and capacity relates to
the legislature’s ability to enact laws and appropriate funds without executive ap-
proval and whether the legislature is regularly in session with experienced legislators.
Table 2.6 presents the results when considering the sample of countries separated
by PPI scores. Specification 1 includes the entire PPI sample and the nonlinear
relationship is still estimated, although the coefficients are not statistically significant
at standard levels. I still find the estimated optimal Strength within the same range
as the preferred specification at 65.4% of the legislature with a 95% confidence interval
ranging from 61.5% to 69.4%. The effect of shifting executive control of the legislature
by a within-country standard deviation to optimal Strength is estimated to increase
growth by 0.67 percentage points with a long-run increase of 9.65% in GDP per capita.
Specification 2 of Table 2.6 only includes the sample of countries where legislatures
have half or less of the specified powers in the PPI. I do not find the same nonlinear
relationship as the preferred specification, likely due to the lack of variation at the
low end of Strength for these legislatures.
Specification 3 of Table 2.6 only includes the sample of legislatures that have
between one-quarter and three-quarters of the specified powers by the PPI. The non-
linear relationship between Strength and growth reappears, although the coefficients
are not statistically significant at standard levels. The 95% confidence interval for
optimal Strength is somewhat wider from 57.1% to 70.8%, but the point estimate
for optimal Strength is remarkably close to the preferred specification at 64% of the
legislature. Shifting executive control of the legislature by a within-country standard
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Table 2.6: Executive Control of the Legislature and Legislative Authority
Entire PPI Low PPI Middle PPI High PPI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strength 0.388 -0.108 0.271 1.193***
(0.255) (0.297) (0.263) (0.425)
Strength2 -0.297 0.076 -0.212 -0.918***
(0.191) (0.223) (0.198) (0.321)
Log GDP pc (t− 1) 1.095*** 1.051*** 1.098*** 1.116***
(0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.064)
Log GDP pc (t− 2) -0.107** -0.031 -0.112** -0.204**
(0.049) (0.050) (0.053) (0.091)
Log GDP pc (t− 3) 0.000 -0.001 0.009 0.022
(0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.067)
Log GDP pc (t− 4) -0.057*** -0.086*** -0.065*** -0.028
(0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.036)
Optimal Strength 0.654 NA 0.640 0.650
[0.615,0.694] NA [0.571,0.708] [0.630,0.670]
Observations 4491 2180 3861 2541
Countries 154 81 128 81
Anderson LR-stat 184.340 144.547 168.190 60.126
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hansen J-stat 0.511 0.589 0.064 3.621
p-value 0.475 0.443 0.801 0.057
Country and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Additional covariates include gov-
ernment consumption, investment rates, and population growth. Robust standard errors re-
ported in the parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Optimal Strength levels are cal-
culated with the Delta method and 95% confidence interval presented in brackets. The null
for the Anderson test is that the first-stage regressions are under identified, i.e. instruments
are not correlated with the endogenous regressors. The null for the Hansen test is that the
excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, i.e. instruments are exogenous.
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deviation to optimal Strength is estimated to increase growth by 0.47 percentage
points and a long-run increase of 6.78% in GDP per capita.
The final specification of Table 2.6 only includes legislatures that have half or
more of the specified powers of the PPI. I find the coefficients on Strength significant
and much larger in magnitude. It should be noted that Hansen J-statistic marginally
rejects that the instruments are exogenous, potentially indicating citizens attribute
economic performance, both good and bad, to members of legislatures with more
authority. Optimal Strength is again estimated near the preferred specification at
65% of the legislature with a narrow confidence interval ranging from 63% to 67%. A
within-country standard deviation shift to optimal Strength is estimated to increase
growth by 2.07 percentage points and a long run increase of 22.06% in GDP per
capita. The results from splitting the sample by parliamentary power suggest that
the effect of Strength may only hold in legislatures with some relative authority,
while executive control of the legislature may not provide a signal of Strength for
governing politicians when the legislature lacks authority.
Autocracies, Democracies, and Mixed Systems
Across political systems, governing politicians face varying probabilities of replace-
ment, as well as potential to regain power in the future. More open political systems
lower the cost of replacing governing politicians, while closed political systems raise
this cost. We may expect the effect of Strength to differ across regimes as Minier
(2007) finds empirical evidence that differences in institutions may lead to different
aggregate production functions. Separating the sample between democratic, auto-
cratic, and mixed systems, I continue find intermediate Strength enhances growth.
Table 2.7 presents the results with the sample limited to country-year observations
with a Polity score. Specification 1 includes the entire Polity sample and is consistent
with the main results. The estimated optimal Strength is 65.6% of seats held by
governing politicians with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 63.5% to 67.8%.
Shifting executive control of the legislature by a within-country standard deviation
to optimal Strength is estimated to increase growth by 1.21 percentage points and
a long-run increase of 23.69% in GDP per capita. Again, it should be noted that
the Hansen J-statistic marginally rejects that the instruments are exogenous. Spec-
ification 2 only includes the sample of autocratic country-years (Polity score ≤ −6)
and the nonlinear relationship between Strength and growth still holds, although
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Table 2.7: Executive Control of the Legislature and Regime Type
All Polity Autocracies Mixed Systems Democracies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strength 0.697*** 0.594 0.690 1.374*
(0.217) (2.242) (0.680) (0.706)
Strength2 -0.531*** -0.409 -0.517 -1.143**
(0.161) (1.543) (0.503) (0.575)
Log GDP pc (t− 1) 1.079*** 0.967*** 0.911*** 1.218***
(0.037) (0.060) (0.061) (0.038)
Log GDP pc (t− 2) -0.075 -0.009 0.013 -0.309***
(0.053) (0.079) (0.075) (0.060)
Log GDP pc (t− 3) 0.027 0.024 0.039 0.083
(0.045) (0.077) (0.060) (0.066)
Log GDP pc (t− 4) -0.082*** -0.063 -0.060 -0.062
(0.026) (0.046) (0.045) (0.042)
Optimal Strength 0.656 0.727 0.667 0.601
[0.635,0.678] [0.628,0.827] [0.616,0.718] [0.578,0.624]
Observations 4444 992 1032 2404
Countries 154 74 84 101
Anderson LR-stat 184.288 8.028 21.511 14.506
p-value 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.001
Hansen J-stat 3.618 2.997 0.206 1.193
p-value 0.057 0.083 0.650 0.275
Country and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Additional covariates include govern-
ment consumption, investment rates, and population growth. Robust standard errors reported in
the parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Optimal Strength levels are calculated with the Delta
method and 95% confidence interval presented in brackets. The null for the Anderson test is that
the first-stage regressions are under identified, i.e. instruments are not correlated with the endoge-
nous regressors. The null for the Hansen test is that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with
the error term, i.e. instruments are exogenous.
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the standard errors on the coefficients are quite large, likely due to a much smaller
sample. However, the 95% confidence interval for optimal Strength 62.8% to 82.7%
contains the estimated optimal levels from the preferred specification. Shifting ex-
ecutive control of the legislature by a within-country standard deviation to optimal
Strength is estimated to increase growth by 0.92 percentage points and a long-run
increase of 11.31% in GDP per capita.
Specification 3 limits the sample to country-years under mixed systems (−5 ≤
Polity score ≤ 5) and I continue to find the nonlinear relationship between Strength
and growth. Optimal Strength is close to the preferred specification, estimated
at 66.7% of the legislature with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 61.6% to
71.8%. Shifting executive control of the legislature by a within-country standard de-
viation to optimal Strength is estimated to increase growth by 1.18 percentage points
and a long-run increase of 12.13% in GDP per capita. I limit the sample to demo-
cratic country-years (Polity score ≥ 6) in specification 4 and find both coefficients on
Strength significant but much larger in magnitude than the preferred specification.
The boost to growth is estimated at 2.59 percentage points when shifting executive
control of the legislature to optimal Strength and a permanent shift is estimated to
increase GDP per capita by 37.02% in the long-run. If intermediate Strength has
such a large effect on the growth of average income levels, we would expect voters that
only care about economic performance to push executive control of the legislature to-
wards an intermediate share. However, voters may also value the ability to replace
politicians and worry that a governing executive approaching the estimated optimal
Strength level may be able to consolidate power preventing replacement. This could
be why there is a large cluster of countries in Figure 2.3 below but approaching the
estimated optimal Strength level.
Mechanisms
The effect of Strength on economic growth could operate through a number of mech-
anisms. I find that intermediate levels of Strength are associated with lower shares
of government consumption in GDP and higher investment rates. This presents two
channels through which intermediate levels of Strength enhance growth.
In examining which channels Strength could affect growth other than through
aggregate productivity, I estimate regressions of the following form:
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mi,t =
T∑
s=1
ρsmi,t−s +X
′
i,tβ + γ1Strengthi,t + γ2Strength
2
i,t + ui + vt + εi,t
where mi,t is a potential mechanism through which Strength could affect growth
in country i and period t. The mechanisms I examine are government consumption
share of GDP and investment rates. Lags of the mechanism are included to account
for any persistence in government consumption or investment rates. Although not
specified by the motivating model, I find a nonlinear relationship between Strength
and each mechanism. Country fixed effects and a time trend are also included to
account for any country-specific factors or overall global trend.
Table 2.8: Executive Control of the Legislature and Investment Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strength 0.319** 0.294* 0.279* 0.270*
(0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)
Strength2 -0.268** -0.249** -0.239** -0.233*
(0.121) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120)
Investment Rate (t− 1) 0.114* 0.108** 0.100** 0.095**
(0.059) (0.051) (0.045) (0.043)
Investment Rate (t− 2) 0.099** 0.094** 0.090**
(0.048) (0.043) (0.040)
Investment Rate (t− 3) 0.092*** 0.090***
(0.024) (0.023)
Investment Rate (t− 4) 0.049***
(0.016)
Optimal Strength 0.595 0.589 0.583 0.579
[0.478,0.711] [0.465,0.714] [0.452,0.713] [0.442,0.716]
Observations 5922 5796 5666 5526
Countries 186 185 185 185
Country and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Robust standard errors reported in the
parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Optimal Strength levels are calculated with the Delta method
and 95% confidence interval presented in brackets.
Table 2.8 reports the effect of Strength on investment rates. I find the same
nonlinear relationship between investment rates and Strength, although the coeffi-
cients are only marginally significant as more lags of the investment rate are included.
Specification 1 estimates optimal Strength at 59.5% with a 95% confidence interval
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ranging from 47.8% to 71.1%. Shifting executive control of the legislature by a within-
country standard deviation to optimal Strength is estimated to increase investment
rates by 0.61 percentage points. As more lags of investment rate are included, the
estimated optimal Strength decreases slightly to 57.9% in specification 4 with a wider
95% confidence interval ranging from 44.2% to 71.6%. The effect of shifting to opti-
mal Strength is also somewhat mitigated at an estimated at 0.53 percentage point
increase in investment rate. Since investment rates are less persistent than GDP, the
long-run increase in investment rate is only 0.78% for a permanent within-country
standard deviation shift to optimal Strength.
Table 2.9: Executive Control of the Legislature and Government Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Strength -0.204** -0.153* -0.127 -0.108
(0.097) (0.089) (0.087) (0.085)
Strength2 0.172** 0.132* 0.112 0.097
(0.077) (0.072) (0.070) (0.068)
Government Size (t− 1) 0.189 0.164* 0.141* 0.127*
(0.133) (0.097) (0.079) (0.072)
Government Size (t− 2) 0.181** 0.168** 0.148**
(0.088) (0.077) (0.065)
Government Size (t− 3) 0.099** 0.091**
(0.049) (0.041)
Government Size (t− 4) 0.104***
(0.034)
Optimal Strength 0.591 0.580 0.565 0.554
[0.464,0.717] [0.429,0.731] [0.389,0.741] [0.346,0.763]
Observations 5923 5798 5669 5529
Countries 186 185 185 185
Country and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Robust standard errors reported in the
parentheses are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Optimal Strength levels are calculated with the Delta method
and 95% confidence interval presented in brackets.
Table 2.9 reports the effect of Strength on government consumption share of GDP.
Here, I find a nonlinear relationship between government consumption and Strength,
though intermediate Strength now is estimated to reduce government consumption.
In specification 1 optimal Strength is estimated at 59.1% with a 95% confidence
interval ranging from 46.4% to 71.7%. Shifting executive control of the legislature
by a within-country standard deviation to optimal Strength is estimated to reduce
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government consumption by 0.40 percentage points. As more lags of government
consumption are included, the estimated optimal Strength decreases to 55.4% in
specification 4 with a much wider 95% confidence interval ranging from 34.6% to
76.3%. The lower level of optimal Strength is consistent with more political compe-
tition resulting in less distortionary taxation as a means of rent-seeking. The effect
of shifting to optimal Strength is reduced to an estimated at 0.23 percentage point
decrease in government consumption share of GDP in specification 4. Again as the
persistence in government consumption is much smaller than GDP per capita, the
long-run decrease in government consumption is only 0.37% for a permanent within-
country standard deviation shift to optimal Strength.
2.6 Conclusion
This essay provides empirical evidence that executive control of the legislature has
a nonlinear relationship with economic growth. Executive control of the legislature
provides a measure of strength regarding the probability of replacement for govern-
ing politicians. As the probability of replacement decreases, governing politicians
discount the future less although political rents increase. I find a robust nonlinear
relationship between strength and economic growth when controlling for the dynam-
ics of the GDP per capita. The estimated effect of shifting executive control of the
legislature towards an intermediate share is around a 1 percentage point increase in
growth rates and a long-run increase in GDP per capita of nearly 20%.
This research extends the literature about the effect of political systems on growth,
illustrating a potential reason why the effect of democracy has been found to be
mixed. Although decreasing with higher levels of democracy, executive control of the
legislature has considerable variation across regimes. These results suggest that a
balance of power between the politicians controlling the state and private economic
agents affects economic performance.
This balance of power between governing politicians and private economic agents
shapes their incentives. When the executive controls most of the legislature, govern-
ing politicians have no incentive to limit rents as they are unlikely to be replaced,
while an executive controlling far less than half of the legislature will not invest in
productive spending as they unlikely to see the returns. When the executive controls
an intermediate share of the legislature, governing politicians understand to reduce
their probability of replacement they can limit current political rents. As governing
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politicians reduce rents, private economic agents will invest more in the future. This
essay provides empirical evidence that intermediate share of the legislature controlled
by the executive enhances economic growth.
Copyright c© Andrew Jonelis, 2019.
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Chapter 3 Borders Change, Institutions Remain
3.1 Introduction
Nearly one hundred years after the end of World War I, we can see persistent effects
in the way individuals behave in countries that were part of the former empires of
Germany and Austria-Hungary. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, the areas of Poland
that were formerly part of the German Empire strongly preferred the Civic Party in
the 2007 legislative elections while the areas that were never part of German Empire
strongly preferred the Law and Justice party. A similar effect can be seen in the 2014
Romanian presidential election in Figure 3.2. The areas of modern Romania that were
part of Austria-Hungary strongly preferred Klaus Iohannis to Victor Ponta, while
the opposite held in the areas not formerly part of Austria-Hungary. This provides
suggestive evidence that historical borders have shaped modern voting behaviors.
Border changes over time could shape the persistence of national institutions and
where economic activity is concentrated.
Figure 3.1: 2007 Polish Legislative Election
This essay examines how the persistence of institutions at a local level affects the
modern concentration of economic activity. Border changes over the last two hundred
years have provided nearby areas with different institutional histories. I find that both
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Figure 3.2: 2014 Romanian Presidential Election
initial conditions and collapses in the institutional environment are persistent at a
local level even when controlling for the effects of modern borders. Using the within
country variation, I find that areas with a longer history of more open institutions
have higher night light intensity today. The results seem to be driven by competition
in executive recruitment and a higher degree of executive constraint. Additionally,
I find differential effects for countries along the technological frontier compared to
those lagging behind.
To construct an institutional history at a local level, I use eight global maps at
dates over the past two centuries. Each grid cell of one degree latitude and longitude is
assigned the institutional value for the country to which it belongs at that time. This
provides within-country variation of institutional histories given modern boundaries.
To my knowledge, this is the first work of research to examine the modern effects of
institutional history at a local level for a global sample.
Night light intensity is used as a proxy for the concentration of economic activ-
ity, first popularized by Henderson et al. (2012). In a follow up paper, Henderson
et al. (2017) show that geographic variables explain around 45% of the variation in
modern night light intensity at a granular level, leaving the majority of variation to
be explained by other factors. I show that each area’s local institutional history has
a significant effect on night light intensity even controlling for geography, historical
population density, and modern country effects.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows: section 3.2 discusses the persistence
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of historical events on modern development, section 3.3 describes the measures of
institutional history constructed for this essay and their effect on modern economic
activity, and section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 History and Modern Economic Development
A growing body of literature explores the deep roots of modern economic develop-
ment, see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) for a detailed exposition. Diamond (1998)
forcefully argues that the modern advantage of Europe and Asia began with the do-
mestication of animals and plants in the Fertile Crescent. The east-west orientation
of the Eurasian continent allowed the agricultural revolution to spread all the way
from England to Japan. The lack of animals and plants to domesticate in Africa
and the Americas and their north-south axis slowed the spread of agriculture. Early
agricultural adoption tends to coincide with a long state history leading to higher
income levels today (Bockstette et al. (2002), Borcan et al. (2018)).
Multiple scholars have argued how colonialism has affected the development path
of former colonies through institutions (Acemoglu et al. (2001)), education (Glaeser
et al. (2004)), or both (Easterly and Levine (2016)). The local environment of colonies
determined the colonization strategy either settling in favorable climates or subjugat-
ing the local population in climates hostile to potential settlers. Where Europeans
settled, they brought higher levels of human capital and implemented more open po-
litical institutions which have persisted to modern day. In areas where Europeans
did not settle, they set up extractive regimes using either cheap or forced labor and
found no need for mass education of the local populace or providing them with po-
litical rights.
These cross-country studies obscure within country variation in both institutions
and human capital investments. Christian missionaries to both Africa and South
America during colonialism have had persistent effects on human capital in villages
where they settled. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Cagé and Rueda (2016) find higher news-
paper readership in areas where Protestant missionaries imported printing presses
leading to more political participation and efficiency of public spending today. Sim-
ilarly, Caicedo (2017) finds areas where Jesuits set up missions in Argentina, Brazil,
and Uruguay have higher rates of literacy and more night light intensity. Addition-
ally, forced labor practices in colonial Peru and the Congo have had effects persist
through today. Dell (2010) finds that areas subject the mita of forced labor in the
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silver mines during colonial times have lower consumption levels today and more ev-
idence of stunting in children. Lowes and Montero (2016) find that areas subject to
labor exploitation for rubber during King Leopold’s reign in the Belgian Congo have
lower education levels and less wealth. This is the first research to my knowledge to
look at how the history of national institutions has affected economic activity at a
local level in a global sample.
3.3 Institutions and Borders
Over the past two hundred years, some nations have disappeared from the face of
the earth, while others have risen to take their place or split from existing countries,
leaving many borders today looking different from historic borders. This provides
an opportunity to examine institutional persistence in areas that have fallen under
the domain of different regimes over time. Using historic maps over the past two
centuries, I calculate the institutional history of each grid cell of Earth’s landmass
(one degree latitude by longitude, approximately 4785 sq. miles or 12492 sq. km at
the equator). There is strong evidence of institutional persistence from both initial
conditions and collapses in the institutional environment. Using this variation in
institutional persistence, I find evidence that areas with a longer history of more
open political institutions have higher levels of night light intensity today.
My primary data sources are the Polity IV data set and the night light intensity
data along with geographic variables from Henderson et al. (2017) and historical
population density from Klein Goldewijk et al. (2011). I combine these data sets by
using a series of historical maps to assign each grid cell a normalized value of 0 (more
closed political system) to 1 (more open political system) for each year between 1800
and 2010. By summing these normalized values, I create a variable HistoryLat,Lon
and determine its relationship with the modern concentration of economic activity
measured by night light intensity.
The Polity IV data set is one of the most commonly used in the literature when
estimating the effects of autocracy and democracy on economic outcomes. It also
provides the longest time series for these institutional variables with many countries
measured as far back as 1800. The namesake variable of this data set is polity2 which
is defined as the democ score less the autoc score. Both of the autoc and democ scores
are based on subcomponents of competition in executive recruitment (xrreg, xrcomp,
and xropen), constraint on executive power (xconst), and political participation and
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Table 3.1: Polity IV Variable Descriptions
Institutional Variable higher value indicates...
polity2 ... more open political system, more democratic
and less autocratic.
democ ... more democratic political system.
autoc ... more autocratic political system.
xrreg ... a more regulated process for executive succession.
xrcomp ... a more competitive process for selection of executive.
xropen ... a more open field for executive candidates.
xconst ... a higher degree of executive constraint.
parreg ... more open participation of political interests.
parcomp ... more competition among political interests.
regulation (parcomp and parreg). For each of these variables, I normalize their score
between 0 and 1 for each year observed in the Polity IV and each grid cell of latitude
and longitude. Table 3.1 describes the institutional variables as they range from 0 to
1.
Table 3.2 below lists the dates for the historical maps used in this essay. The first
map is dated 1783 and follows the formal conclusion of the American Revolutionary
War. The next major war to shape international borders is the end of the Napoleonic
Wars in 1815. Following Napoleon’s defeat, imperialism ascends to a fever pitch in
Europe until the Scramble for Africa splits most of the African continent between
European powers in 1880. Two World Wars shape the next maps 1914 to 1919 and
1939 to 1945. The final major event is the dissolution of the Soviet Union and other
communist nations by 1992. Although, I do not at this time have detailed maps
for every year for which the Polity IV data set covers, this should provide a first
approximation of a local area’s institutional history. While European borders are
likely less exogenous than those created in Africa by colonial powers, identification
in this essay is driven by the persistence of institutions.
The night light intensity data set has gained popularity as a way to measure
economic activity at a more granular level than nations, regions, or states. Henderson
et al. (2017) used it to show that much of the variation in the modern concentration
of economic activity is driven by favorable geography. I build off of their data set
with the historical maps to determine the institutional experience of local areas over
the last two hundred years. I define an area’s institutional history by the sum of the
normalized Polity variables:
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Table 3.2: Historical Dates of Maps
Year Historical Event Major Border Changes
1783 Treaty of Paris United States separate from Great Britain
1815 Congress of Vienna French Empire dissolves into many countries
1880 Scramble for Africa European powers divide African continent
1914 World War I Begins Ottoman Empire loses Balkans territories
1919 World War I Ends Austria-Hungary and German Empires dissolve
into many countries
1939 World War II Begins Germany annexes Austria and Sudetenland and
Japan invades China
1945 World War II Ends German and Japanese Empires dissolve
into many countries
1992 Cold War Ends USSR and Yugoslavia dissolve into many countries
HistoryLat,Lon =
2010∑
t=1800
institutionLat,Lon,t
There is a vast difference in institutional experience across the sixteen and a
half thousand grid cells covering landmass. The average number of years achieving
the highest Polity score is around 78. On average, the grid cells have experienced
more autocracy (110 years) than democracy (65 years). The longest institutional
experience that a grid cell receives on average is a well regulated process for executive
succession at 143 years. Highly rated political participation occurs in nearly 117
years on average, while more openness in executive recruitment (99 years), more
competition in politics (98 years), and high executive constraint (80 years) occur in
less than half of the years in the Polity data set at a grid cell level. There are grid
cells with the longest possible history of complete autocracy, while no grid cells have
experienced an unblemished history of the highest Polity or democracy score. This is
due to political repression as some cells have the longest possible experience of high
executive constraint and open executive recruitment.
Institutional Persistence
I first examine the persistence of institutions at a local area. I find strong evidence of
institutional persistence from both initial conditions and collapses in the institutional
environment. The normalized institutional value in 1800 is strongly correlated with an
area’s institutional history. Additionally, what I refer to as “institutional collapses”
throughout the essay, the minimum normalized value (maximum for autoc) of an
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institutional variable observed over each grid cell’s history is strongly correlated with
an area’s institutional history. I first estimate the following equation:
ln(HistoryLat,Lon) = β× InstitutionLat,Lon,1800 +P ′Lat,Lonρ+G′Lat,Lonγ+D′Lat,Lonδ+ ε
where
• InstitutionLat,Lon,1800 is the initial institutional value in 1800
• PLat,Lon is a vector of population density in 1500 and 1800
• GLat,Lon is a vector of geographic variables including indicators for biome type,
distance to bodies of water, absolute latitude, ruggedness, and malaria environ-
ment
• DLat,Lon is a set of country indicators
Table 3.3 provides evidence of how persistent institutions are by regressing a local
area’s institutional history against its value in 1800. Column one shows that a local
area rated with the highest polity2 score in 1800 is estimated to experience 63.2%
more years at the highest polity2 score. This value in 1800 along with a grid cell’s
geography, historical population density, and modern country effect explains 83.6%
of the variation in an area’s institutional experience. The persistence experienced in
the subcomponents of polity2 is estimated to be even stronger in magnitude. Column
2 estimates that a local area with the highest democ in 1800 experiences 89.3% more
years with the highest democracy score. 80.9% of the variation in total democratic
history is explained by democ in 1800 and the geographic variables, historical pop-
ulation density, and modern country effect. A local area with the highest autoc is
estimated to experience 127.7% more years under the highest degree of autocracy in
column 3. 86.7% of the variation in years with the highest autoc is explained by initial
level of autocracy along with the grid cell’s geography, historical population density,
and modern country effect. The degree of institutional persistence for these broad
measures of open and closed political institutions is even greater than the further
subcomponents of autoc and democ suggesting complementary effects from executive
recruitment, constraint, and political participation in keeping political systems more
open or closed.
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Table 3.3: Persistence: Initial Institutions and Institutional History
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Initial polity2 0.632***
(0.041)
Initial democ 0.893***
(0.061)
Initial autoc 1.277***
(0.052)
Initial xrreg 0.345***
(0.015)
Initial xrcomp 0.193***
(0.016)
Initial xropen 0.160***
(0.021)
Initial xconst 0.643***
(0.035)
Initial parreg 0.468***
(0.024)
Initial parcomp 0.533***
(0.030)
Observations 15258 15258 15258 15258 15258 15258 15258 15258 15258
R2 0.836 0.809 0.867 0.825 0.850 0.800 0.827 0.827 0.839
Additional covariates include indicators for the local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indicators for on coast,
river, harbor, distance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and country dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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The greatest degree of persistence from 1800 at a local level in a sub-component
is xconst in column 7. The highest level of xconst in 1800 is estimated to increase
the number of years under high executive constraint by 64.3%. The subcomponents
related to executive recruitment are estimated to be much less persistent in columns
5 and 6. The highest level of xrcomp in 1800 is estimated to increase the number of
years with high executive competition by 19.3%, while the highest level of xropen in
1800 is estimated to increase the number of years with more open executive recruit-
ment by 16%. A well regulated process for executive succession in 1800 (xrreg) is
estimated to increase the number of years with well regulated executive succession by
34.5%. For all subcomponents related to the executive, the initial value in 1800 along
with an area’s geography and modern country effects explains between 80% and 85%
of the variation in the institutional history of a grid cell.
There is a considerable degree of persistence in political participation and com-
petition. The highest value for parreg in 1800 is estimated to increase a local area’s
history with high political participation by 46.8% in column 8. The highest value for
parcomp in 1800 is estimated to increase a local area’s experience with high political
competition by 53.3% in column 9. Similar to the other institutional variables, 82%
to 84% of the variation in institutional history is explained by initial conditions along
with geography, historical population density, and modern country effects. None of
the subcomponents display the degree of persistence in the broader measures of au-
tocracy and democracy, suggesting that the subcomponent institutions complement
each other in keeping a political system more open or closed.
After examining the degree of institutional persistence since 1800, I examine
whether an institutional collapse persists over time. The collapse is measured as
the lowest value (highest for autoc) for each institutional component observed over
the history of a local area. The conceptual framework for institutional collapses is
to examine whether domestic coups, foreign conquests, or other drastic institutional
changes can persist over time. The results are broadly consistent with the degree of
persistence from initial conditions. Table 3.4 reports the results from estimating the
following equation:
ln(HistoryLat,Lon) = β×min(InstitutionLat,Lon)+P ′Lat,Lonρ+G′Lat,Lonγ+D′Lat,Lonδ+ε
• min(InstitutionLat,Lon) is the lowest normalized value for institutions over the
past 210 years (highest autoc)
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• PLat,Lon is a vector of population density in 1500 and 1800
• GLat,Lon is a vector of geographic variables including indicators for biome type,
distance to bodies of water, absolute latitude, ruggedness, and malaria environ-
ment
• DLat,Lon is a set of country indicators
The results confirm the persistence of institutions. In column 1 of Table 3.4, a grid
cell that ever experiences the lowest polity2 is estimated to experience 47.6% fewer
years under the most open political institutions. Column 2 finds the persistence of
collapses in democ to be even higher at 67.1% fewer years with the most democratic
political system for a grid cell that ever experiences the lowest democ. In column 3, I
find that autocratic collapses are especially persistent as a grid cell that experiences
the highest autoc will have an estimated 325% more years under the most severe form
of autocracy. Again, over 80% of the variation in these broad institutional histories
are explained by the institutional persistence from collapses, along with geography,
historical population density, and modern country effects.
Persistence from collapses in the institutional subcomponents related to the ex-
ecutive are broadly consistent with the degree of persistence from initial conditions.
Again, the highest degree of persistence is for executive constraint in column 7. A
collapse to the lowest degree of executive constraint is estimated to reduce the number
of years with high executive constraint by 42.6%. Collapses in the level of xrcomp
(column 5) are estimated to be more persistent than the degree of xrcomp in 1800,
where an area that experiences the lowest level of xrcomp is estimated to reduce the
number of years with high executive competition by 34.5%. Collapses relating to
the regulation of executive succession are estimated to be less persistent than initial
conditions where an experience of the lowest level of xrreg (column 4) is estimated
to reduce the number of years of with well-regulated executive succession by 13.1%.
In column 6, collapses in xropen are estimated to be similar to initial conditions
as the lowest level of xropen is estimated to reduce the number of years with more
open executive recruitment by 20.4%. Collapses in institutions related to executive
constraint, recruitment, and succession explain around 80% of the variation in in-
stitutional history along with geography, historical population density, and modern
country effects.
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Table 3.4: Persistence: Institutional Collapses and Institutional History
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
min(polity2) 0.476***
(0.043)
min(democ) 0.671***
(0.056)
max(autoc) 3.250***
(0.076)
min(xrreg) 0.131***
(0.019)
min(xrcomp) 0.345***
(0.020)
min(xropen) 0.204***
(0.021)
min(xconst) 0.426***
(0.033)
min(parreg) 0.211***
(0.025)
min(parcomp) 0.329***
(0.049)
Observations 16344 16344 16344 16344 16344 16344 16344 16344 16344
R2 0.832 0.809 0.899 0.787 0.818 0.779 0.819 0.798 0.815
Additional covariates include indicators for a local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indicators for on coast,
river, harbor, distance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and continental dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *,
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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The effect of collapses on the history of political participation and competition are
estimated to be smaller than the persistence from initial conditions. I find a collapse
to the lowest parreg is estimated to reduce the number of years with high political
participation by 21.1%. Column 9 shows that an experience with the lowest parcomp
is estimated to reduce number of years with high political competition by 32.9%.
Similar to above, collapses in the institutions of political participation and compe-
tition explain around 80% of the variation in institutional history with geography,
historical population density, and modern country effects.
Institutional History and Modern Economic Activity
Table 3.5 provides evidence of a correlation between the history political institutions
and higher night light intensity at a granular level worldwide. The coefficients on
most institutional variables are found to be statistically significant at a 1% level
even accounting for geography, historical population density, and modern country
effects. The magnitude of the effect varies across institutional dimensions, but the
results suggest generally that areas with a history of more open political institutions
have higher modern concentrations of economic activity. The estimated regression
equation takes the form:
ln(LightLat,Lon,2010) = β × ln(HistoryLat,Lon) + P ′Lat,Lonρ+G′Lat,Lonγ +D′Lat,Lonδ + ε
where
• PLat,Lon is a vector of population density in 1500 and 1800
• GLat,Lon is a vector of geographic variables including indicators for biome type,
distance to bodies of water, absolute latitude, ruggedness, and malaria environ-
ment
• DLat,Lon is a set of country indicators
In column 1 of Table 3.5, a 1% increase in the number of years with the highest
polity2 score increases night light activity by 0.085%. The history of democ in column
2 is also estimated to increase economic activity although the magnitude of the effect
is around half at a 1% increase in democ years increasing night light activity by
0.046%. In the opposite direction, column 3 shows that areas with a longer history
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of autoc have lowers the modern concentrations of economic activity. A 1% increase
in autoc years is estimated to decrease night light intensity by 0.206%. These effects
are all found to be highly significant even controlling for the modern institutional and
policy environment with country indicators.
Broad measures of an area’s historical experience with autocracy and democracy
are found to affect economic activity, but I find evidence that some institutional fea-
tures matter more than others in driving these effects. In examining how executive
recruitment and succession occurs, the strongest effect comes from more open re-
cruitment of the executive in column 6. A 1% increase in the number of years at
the highest xropen is estimated to increase night light intensity by 0.243%. A 1%
longer history of competition in executive recruitment is estimated to increase night
light intensity by 0.131% in column 5. The history of a well-regulated process for
executive succession is found to have a negative effect in column 4. A 1% increase in
the number of years at the highest xrreg is estimated to decrease night light intensity
by 0.056%. In column 7, a history of executive constraint is found to significantly
increase the concentration of economic activity. A 1% increase in the number of years
with the highest xconst is found to increase night light intensity by 0.095%.
Lastly, examining the environment for political participation and competition, I
find evidence that competition matters more than participation. Column 8 shows a
1% increase in the number of years at the highest score for parreg is estimated to
decrease night light intensity by 0.013%, although not statistically different from a
null effect. The degree of competition in an area’s history is found to have a much
larger and significant effect on economic activity. A 1% increase in the number of
years at the highest parcomp is found to increase night light intensity 0.068% in
column 9.
The correlation between institutional history and modern economic activity at a
local level is evident from Table 3.5. However, this does not give causal evidence that
institutional history is determining night light intensity, as a greater concentration
of economic activity may lead to more open political institutions. To determine the
causal effect of institutional experience on modern economic activity, I use the highly
persistent nature of institutions (North (1990)) found at a local level from initial
conditions and collapses. Using an instrumental variables strategy, I instrument for
a local area’s institutional history with the value observed in 1800 or the lowest value
over the last two centuries.
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Table 3.5: Institutional History and Modern Economic Activity: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
History of polity2 0.085***
(0.025)
History of democ 0.046***
(0.016)
History of autoc -0.206***
(0.030)
History of xrreg -0.056**
(0.025)
History of xrcomp 0.131***
(0.035)
History of xropen 0.243***
(0.035)
History of xconst 0.095***
(0.019)
History of parreg -0.013
(0.023)
History of parcomp 0.068**
(0.034)
Observations 16391 16391 16391 16391 16391 16391 16391 16391 16391
R2 0.764 0.764 0.765 0.764 0.764 0.765 0.765 0.764 0.764
Additional covariates include indicators for a local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indicators for on coast, river,
harbor, distance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and continental dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Tables 3.3 and 3.4 provided evidence that institutions persist from initial condi-
tions as well as collapses in the institutional environment. I use initial values and
collapses as instruments for the effect of institutional history on modern economic
activity at local levels, separately in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 and then together in Table
3.8. Both initial conditions and collapses should theoretically satisfy the exclusion
restriction. While economic development leading up to 1800 could affect institu-
tional values, modern night light intensity should be correlated with institutions in
1800 only through the persistence of institutions, especially as I control for the his-
torical concentration of economic activity with population density in 1500 and 1800.
Additionally, according to modernization theory (Lipset (1959), others), economic
development paves the way for democratization and more open political institutions
generally. Collapses in a local area’s institutions should be unrelated to economic
growth as we would expect more economic activity to lead to more open political
institutions.
Table 3.6 presents the results for the effect of institutional history on modern eco-
nomic activity when instrumenting with the initial value in 1800 while still controlling
for geography, historical population density, and modern country effects. The same
pattern emerges that a longer history of more open political institutions is associated
with greater night light intensity. In column 1 of Table 3.6, a 1% increase in the
years of polity2 is estimated to increase night light intensity by 1.433%. The effect
of a longer history of democ has a somewhat smaller effect in column 2 where a 1%
increase in democ years is estimated to increase night light intensity by 1.221%. An
institutional history of autoc is estimated to significantly reduce economic activity
where a 1% increase in autoc decreases night light intensity by 0.562%. Again, these
institutional histories are estimated to significantly affect modern economic activity
even controlling for geography, historical population density, and modern country
effects.
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Table 3.6: Institutional History and Modern Economic Activity - IV Initial Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
History of polity2 1.433***
(0.246)
History of democ 1.221***
(0.192)
History of autoc -0.562***
(0.103)
History of xrreg 0.108
(0.128)
History of xrcomp 10.284***
(1.118)
History of xropen 10.319***
(1.650)
History of xconst 0.360***
(0.137)
History of parreg 0.213
(0.138)
History of parcomp -0.969***
(0.311)
Observations 15258 15258 15258 15258 15258 15258 15258 15258 15258
Anderson LR-stat 341.918 227.329 2736.905 1243.684 156.326 83.299 571.638 937.460 575.227
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Additional covariates include indicators for a local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indicators for on coast, river, har-
bor, distance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and continental dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
45
For the variables related to the executive, I find significant effects from longer
histories of executive recruitment and constraint. However, I find no significant effect
from a longer history of regulated executive succession. A longer history of xrreg is
estimated to have a positive impact on night light intensity in column 4, although
not significantly different from zero. In column 5, a 1% increase in years with high
xrcomp is estimated to increase night light intensity by 10.284%. I find the effect of
a 1% increase of years with high xropen to be similar at 10.319%. These estimated
effects are quite large compared to OLS likely due to limited variation in initial levels
of openness and competitiveness for executive recruitment. Only the United States
had the highest level of both xropen and xrcomp, additionally France had the highest
xropen. The estimated effect of a 1% increase in years with high xconst is estimated
to increase night light intensity by 0.360% in column 7.
The final two columns of Table 3.6 examine how the history of political compe-
tition and participation affect modern economic development. In column 8, a longer
history of political participation is estimated to increase night light intensity, but
the effect is not found to be significant. More political participation is found to
marginally significant and decrease night light intensity. A 1% increase in years with
high parcomp is estimated to decrease night light intensity by 0.969%.
Table 3.7 presents the results for the effect of institutional history on modern
economic activity when instrumenting with institutional collapses while controlling
for the effect of geography, historical population density, and modern country effects.
A similar pattern emerges where a longer history of more open political institutions
increases modern night light intensity. Additionally, the estimated effects tend to be
similar to the previous table, although attenuated from the relatively high estimated
effects of longer executive competition and openness.
Column 1 finds the estimated effect of a longer history of polity2 is found to be
over twice as large in magnitude as the previous table. Here, I estimate that a 1%
increase in high polity2 years increases night light intensity by 3.864%. Similarly
around twice as large in magnitude as the previous estimate, in column 2 I find that
a 1% increase in democ years increases night light intensity by 2.859%. Lastly, I find
a longer history of autoc to be attenuated in column 3. A 1% increase in years with
a high level of autocracy decreases night light intensity by 0.525%.
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Table 3.7: Institutional History and Modern Economic Activity - IV Institutional Collapses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
History of polity2 3.864***
(0.463)
History of democ 2.859***
(0.328)
History of autoc -0.525***
(0.046)
History of xrreg 2.669***
(0.759)
History of xrcomp 2.118***
(0.305)
History of xropen 4.177***
(0.603)
History of xconst 2.442***
(0.296)
History of parreg -1.905***
(0.518)
History of parcomp 2.518***
(0.677)
Observations 16344.000 16344.000 16344.000 16344.000 16344.000 16344.000 16344.000 16344.000 16344.000
Anderson LR-stat 156.365 116.943 12415.830 56.846 647.707 197.926 237.276 71.513 144.169
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Additional covariates include indicators for a local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indicators for on coast, river, harbor, dis-
tance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and continental dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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The effects of longer histories of executive constraint, recruitment, and succession
are all found to significantly increase modern economic activity. In column 4, a 1%
increase in years with high xrreg is estimated to increase night light intensity by
2.669%. The effects of xrcomp and xropen are found to be around 20% to 30%
in magnitude from the previous table. I find that a 1% increase in years of high
competition in executive recruitment increases night light intensity by 2.118% in
column 5. A 1% longer history of more open executive recruitment is estimated to
increase night light intensity by 4.117%. Column 7 shows that the estimated effect of
a 1% increase in years with high xconst is a 2.442% increase in night light intensity,
which is around six times larger than the previous table.
In the final two columns of Table 3.7, I find a negative effect from more political
participation, while more political competition increases the modern concentration of
economic activity. I find that a 1% increase in years with high parreg is estimated to
decrease night light intensity by 1.905% in column 8. The final column shows that
1% increase in years with high parcomp is estimated to increase night light intensity
by 2.518%.
Table 3.8 presents the results when using both initial conditions and collapses
as instruments for the institutional history of a grid cell while still controlling for
geography, historical population density, and modern country effects. I continue to
find that a longer history of democracy increases night light intensity, while more
autocracy decreases night light intensity. Here the effect of more open political in-
stitutions seems to be driven by more open executive recruitment (xrcomp, xropen)
and constraint (xconst), without any significant effect from political participation
and competition (parreg, parcomp).
The effect of a 1% increase in polity2 years is estimated to increase night light
intensity by 1.625% in column 1. In column 2, I find that a 1% increase in democ years
increase night light intensity by 1.254%. This is slightly less than twice the magnitude
of a 1% increase in autoc, estimated to decrease night light intensity by 0.650%. All
effects are still found to be statistically significant and the Anderson LR-statistic
suggests that institutional history is not under identified by the instruments.
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Table 3.8: Institutional History and Modern Economic Activity - IV Initial Institutions and Collapses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
History of polity2 1.625***
(0.252)
History of democ 1.254***
(0.193)
History of autoc -0.650***
(0.055)
History of xrreg 0.066
(0.126)
History of xrcomp 1.731***
(0.266)
History of xropen 2.341***
(0.357)
History of xconst 0.472***
(0.140)
History of parreg 0.157
(0.138)
History of parcomp -0.081
(0.261)
Observations 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000
Anderson LR-stat 345.030 227.440 11646.390 1249.941 1103.110 489.234 574.748 942.977 914.536
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Additional covariates include indicators for a local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indicators for on coast, river, harbor, dis-
tance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and continental dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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The institutional history of executive recruitment and constraint is found to sig-
nificantly increase night light intensity, however there is not a significant effect from
a longer history of regulated executive succession. In column 4, a longer history of
xrreg is estimated to increase the modern concentration of economic activity, al-
though the magnitude is relatively small and not significant at standard levels. The
largest effect comes from a longer history of xropen as a 1% increase in years with
more open executive recruitment is estimated to increase night light intensity by
2.431% in column 6. A longer history of xrcomp is found to be significant in column
5 with a 1% increase in high competition for executive recruitment estimated to in-
crease night light intensity by 1.731%. The smallest significant effect comes from a
longer history of executive constraint where a 1% increase in high xconst history is
estimated to increase night light intensity by 0.472% in column 7.
The institutional history of the subcomponents related to political participation
and competition are not found to have a significant effect on the modern concentration
of economic activity when instrumenting with initial conditions and collapses. In
column 8, the effect of an increase in parreg history is estimated to increase night
light intensity although not significantly different from null. I find that a longer
history of parcomp is estimated to decrease night light intensity in column 9, although
again the effect is not significantly different from zero. This suggests that longer
institutional histories of political participation and competition are not driving the
modern concentration of economic activity.
Institutions over Geography
In this section, I explore the different areas of the globe where institutional history
better predicts the modern concentration of economic activity than geography alone
using the results from column 1 of Table 3.8, although it should be noted results are
similar using any of the columns. There are the common examples of poor institutions
hindering economic development on the divided Korean Peninsula and the split island
of Hispaniola. The region containing Seoul is estimated to in the 80th percentile
from geography alone, but by including institutional history it is estimated much
closer to its actual night light intensity in the 95th percentile. The region containing
Pyongyang has more favorable geography that estimates it should be in the 93rd
percentile of the distribution of night light intensity, but its poor institutional history
limits it to the 60th percentile. The regions containing Port-au-Prince and Santo
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Domingo, both on the same latitude and with direct access to the Caribbean Sea,
are estimated to be in the 85th percentile of the distribution of night light intensity
based on geography. However, due to different institutional histories, Port-au-Prince
is pushed down to the 75th percentile and Santo Domingo lifted to the 90th percentile.
Aside from the common examples mentioned above, there are multiple areas
around the globe where institutional history has lifted the concentration of economic
activity beyond what geography would explain alone. The region of Tel Aviv in Is-
rael has relatively poor geography that would limit it to the 75th percentile of the
distribution of night light intensity, while its institutional history lifts it to the 99th
percentile of the distribution. The geography for the island of Hong Kong would esti-
mate that its night light intensity falls in 78th percentile of the distribution, while its
long institutional history of more open politics puts the island in the 99th percentile.
Similarly, Taiwan’s geography suggests that it would fall in the 71st percentile of the
distribution, however its institutional history places Taiwan in the 94th percentile.
Another set of islands on the other side of the world have relatively unfavorable geog-
raphy, but have been lifted by their institutional history. Puerto Rico is estimated to
fall in the 70th percentile of the distribution of night light intensity from geography
alone, but its institutional history lifts the island to the 98th percentile. The volcanic
islands comprising the Lesser Antilles are estimated to fall in the 70th percentile of
the distribution based on their geography, but their long institutional history lifts
them to the 96th percentile of the distribution. The chain of islands off the coast of
Venezuela, Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao, are estimated to fall in the 73th percentile
of the distribution based on their geography, while their long institutional history as
part of the Netherlands lifts their night light intensity to the 94th percentile. Lastly,
another island in another ocean, Mauritius has a relatively unfavorable geography
that would limit its night light intensity to the 64th percentile of the distribution,
however, its institutional history lifts Mauritius to the 93th percentile. Near Mauritius
in the Indian Ocean, Madagascar has a more favorable geography and is estimated
to fall in the 75th percentile of the distribution of night light intensity based on its
geography, while its institutional history limits Madagascar to the 50th percentile.
Institutional History across Generations
This section examines whether more recent history has a greater effect on the con-
centration of economic activity than the entire institutional history since 1800. I
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first examine whether the history since 1890 is different from the entire history, as
at this point in history, most inhabitable landmass on Earth had been claimed by
different world powers. Next, I examine whether the history since the inter-war years
is different by only looking at the institutional history since 1925. Finally, I examine
whether the institutional history in the post-war era has a different effect on modern
economic concentration.
No Areas Left Unclaimed
Six years after the Berlin Conference of 1884 nearly all inhabitable land mass had
been claimed by a nation-state. In this section, I examine whether the institutional
history of an area after 1890 has a significant effect on the modern concentration
of economic activity. I still use an instrumental variables strategy to address the
potential reverse causality between institutional history and economic activity. The
two instruments used for exogenous variation in institutional history are the minimum
value of the institutional measure prior to 1890 and the initial value in 1890. I continue
to find that the instruments explain a significant amount of variation in a local area’s
institutional history as the p-values for the Anderson LR statistic are all well below
a 1% significance level.
Table 3.9 shows the results for the effect of institutional history post 1890 on
modern economic activity. In column 1, I find the estimated effect of a longer history
of high polity2 to increase modern night light intensity, although this effect is not
significantly different from null. This is interesting as over the next two columns
I find significant effects from the two components comprising the polity2 score. A
1% increase in years with the highest democ is estimated to increase night light
intensity by 0.434% in column 2, while a 1% increase in years with the highest autoc
is estimated to decrease night light intensity by 0.064%. All of these estimated effects
are much smaller in magnitude than the effects from the entire institutional history.
This suggests that the period from 1800 to 1890 may have been important for the
effect of broad institutions on concentrating economic activity.
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Table 3.9: Institutional History since 1890 and Modern Economic Activity - IV Initial Institutions and Collapses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
History of polity2 0.110
(0.145)
History of democ 0.434***
(0.141)
History of autoc -0.064**
(0.030)
History of xrreg 0.306***
(0.107)
History of xrcomp 1.580***
(0.251)
History of xropen 0.984**
(0.409)
History of xconst -0.056
(0.129)
History of parreg 0.022
(0.102)
History of parcomp -0.526**
(0.231)
Observations 15926.000 15926.000 15926.000 15926.000 15926.000 15926.000 15926.000 15926.000 15926.000
Anderson LR-stat 727.592 295.149 6207.258 1600.088 641.125 196.493 595.868 1216.365 811.265
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Additional covariates include indicators for a local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indicators for on coast, river, harbor, dis-
tance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and continental dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Over the next four columns, I examine the effect of institutional history since
1890 relating to executive succession and constraint on the modern concentration of
economic activity. In column 4, I find a longer history of well regulated executive
succession since 1890 has a significant effect on modern economic activity. A 1%
increase in the number of years with well regulated executive succession is estimated
to increase night light intensity by 0.306%. This contrasts with the entire history for
regulation of executive succession, where I found no significant effect. The effect of
competition for executive recruitment since 1890 is estimated near what was found
for the entire sample in column 5. I find that a 1% increase in years with high
competition for executive recruitment since 1890 is estimated to increase night light
intensity by 1.58%, only slightly smaller than the 1.731% increase estimated from the
entire history. In column 6, I find a much smaller effect from the history of xropen
since 1890 compared to the entire history, although still found to be statistically
significant. A 1% increase in years with high xropen since 1890 is estimated to
increase night light intensity by 0.984%. Interestingly, I find no significant effect
from the history of xconst since 1890 in column 7 with the estimated coefficient
actually negative.
In the last two columns of Table 3.9, I examine how political participation and
competition since 1890 has affected the modern concentration of economic activity.
While the estimated effect of a longer history of high parreg since 1890 is positive in
column 8, the effect is not statistically significant at standard levels. In column 9, I
find that a longer history of high parcomp since 1890 is actually estimated to reduce
night light intensity where a 1% increase in high parcomp years decreases night light
intensity by -0.526%.
Interwar Era
In this section, I examine how the institutional history since 1925 has affected the
modern concentration of economic activity. The results are drastically different from
the previous tables. Here, I find that a longer history of more closed political insti-
tutions raise the modern concentration of economic activity.
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Table 3.10: Institutional History since 1925 and Modern Economic Activity - IV Initial Institutions and Collapses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
History of polity2 -0.293***
(0.057)
History of democ -0.183***
(0.034)
History of autoc 0.072**
(0.032)
History of xrreg -0.173**
(0.067)
History of xrcomp -0.638***
(0.106)
History of xropen 0.252***
(0.095)
History of xconst -0.181***
(0.045)
History of parreg -0.066
(0.047)
History of parcomp -0.194**
(0.098)
Observations 15466.000 15423.000 15423.000 15423.000 15423.000 15423.000 15423.000 15423.000 15423.000
Anderson LR-stat 3420.876 3298.238 4161.748 3773.419 5336.045 4817.527 4597.285 4421.683 5132.659
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Additional covariates include indicators for a local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indicators for on coast, river, harbor, dis-
tance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and continental dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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The first three columns of Table 3.10 estimate the effect of the broad indicators of
open and closed political systems on the modern concentration of economic activity.
In column 1, I find a longer history of high polity2 is estimated to reduce night light
intensity where a 1% increase in polity2 years since 1925 is estimated to reduce night
light intensity by 0.293%. Similarly, I find that a longer history of democ since 1925
is found to significantly reduce night light intensity. Column 2 shows an estimated
effect of a 1% increase in democ years reduces a night light intensity by 0.183%. I
find in column 3 that a 1% increase in autoc years is estimated to increase night light
intensity by 0.072%. This suggests that a longer history of closed political institutions
since 1925 has been better for economic development at a local level.
Over the next four columns of Table 3.10, I find that more closed executive re-
cruitment and limited executive constraint increases night light intensity, with the
exception of xropen. In column 4, a 1% increase in the number of years with high
xrreg since 1925 is estimated to reduce night light intensity by 0.173%. The estimated
effect of more xrcomp is similarly estimated to reduce night light intensity, where a
1% increase in the number of years with high xrcomp is estimated to reduce night
light intensity by 0.638%. Column 6 shows that more open executive recruitment is
still estimated to increase the concentration of economic activity. A 1% increase in
the number of years with high xropen is estimated to increase night light intensity
by 0.252%. A longer history of high executive constraint since 1925 is also estimated
to reduce the modern concentration of economic activity. In column 7, the estimated
effect of a 1% in years with high xconst since 1925 reduces night light intensity by
0.181%.
Over the last two columns of Table 3.10, I find that a longer history of more
political participation and competition since 1925 is estimated to reduce the modern
concentration of economic activity. I find no significant effect from a longer history of
parreg in column 8, however, in column 9, a 1% increase in years with high parcomp
since 1925 is estimated to reduce night light intensity by 0.194%. This is a much
smaller estimated effect than the effect of the history since 1890.
Cold War and Detente
Following the end of World War II, there has been less change in political boundaries
and much of the institutional history appears to be captured by the country effects.
Only one of the Polity subcomponent indices is found to have a significant effect on the
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concentration of economic activity. On the other hand, most other subcomponents
and the broad indicators are found to have a near zero effect on the concentration
of economic activity. This suggests that the concentration of economic activity into
cities occurred during the period from 1800 to 1960, at least from any effects of
institutional history.
Across the first three columns of Table 3.11, I look at the effect of the history of the
broad measures of institutional openness on the modern concentration of economic
activity. I find no significant effect of any of the three institutional histories at
standard levels. In column 1, a 1% increase in the history of high polity2 is estimated
to decrease night light intensity by 0.055% although the standard error is larger than
the point estimate. The effect of a longer history of high democ in column 2 is
estimated to be nearly zero at a 1% increase in high democ years increasing night
light intensity by 0.004%. I find the effect of a longer history of high autoc to decrease
economic activity although the point estimate is quite close to the standard error in
magnitude.
Over the next four columns of Table 3.11, I examine how the history of execu-
tive recruitment and constraint has affected the concentration of economic activity.
Similar to the broad measures of political openness, I do not find the executive sub-
components significant at standard levels. In column 4, a longer of high xrreg is
estimated to decrease night light intensity but the standard error is similar in magni-
tude to the standard error. A longer history of high xrcomp in column 5 is estimated
to decrease night light intensity although the point estimate is quite close to zero
with a relatively large standard error. Among the executive subcomponents, a longer
history of high xropen is the closest to marginal significance where a 1% increase in
the number of years increases night light intensity by 0.194%. For the effect of high
xconst in column 7, the point estimate is negative but the standard error is almost
the same as the point estimate.
In the last two columns of Table 3.11, I examine how the history of political
regulation and competition affects the modern concentration of economic activity.
I find a longer history of high parreg significantly reduces night light intensity in
column 8, where a 1% increase in the number of years decreases night light intensity
by 0.199%. In the last column of Table 3.11, I find that a longer history of high
parcomp is found to reduce night light intensity, although not significantly different
from a null effect.
57
Table 3.11: Institutional History since 1960 and Modern Economic Activity - IV Initial Institutions and Collapses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
History of polity2 -0.055
(0.060)
History of democ 0.004
(0.033)
History of autoc -0.033
(0.026)
History of xrreg -0.108
(0.091)
History of xrcomp -0.013
(0.119)
History of xropen 0.194
(0.123)
History of xconst -0.073
(0.073)
History of parreg -0.199***
(0.062)
History of parcomp -0.132
(0.088)
Observations 15634.000 15505.000 15505.000 15505.000 15505.000 15505.000 15505.000 15505.000 15505.000
Anderson LR-stat 3891.553 2273.926 5693.123 4635.268 2790.207 2460.560 2297.461 4749.689 6010.931
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Additional covariates include indicators for a local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indicators for on coast, river, harbor, dis-
tance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and continental dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Institutional History and the Technological Frontier
In this section, I examine whether the effect of institutions on the concentration of
modern economic activity is driven by being on the technological frontier. The re-
sults suggest that open, democratic institutions increase the concentration of modern
economic activity for countries on the technological frontier, while closed, autocratic
institutions benefit countries behind the technological frontier. I first interact the
institutional history with an indicator for the countries of Western Europe and their
off-shoots (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States). Then I inter-
act institutional history with an indicator for the members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Both results suggest that “good”
institutions are beneficial on the frontier, while a hindrance for countries lagging
behind the frontier.
Western Europe and Offshoots
Table 3.12 presents the results from interacting an indicator West, representing West-
ern Europe and its offshoots, with institutional history. In all specifications, West
has a significant effect on night light intensity suggesting that Western Europe and
offshoots have a different concentration of economic activity from other countries
around the world. This effect tends to be negative, although positive in column 3,
while the interaction between West and institution history is positive, negative in
column 3. This suggests that areas of Western Europe and offshoots with a longer
history of more open political institutions have higher concentrations of economic
activity today. However, longer institutional histories for countries outside of West-
ern Europe or without a strong Western European heritage reduce modern night
light intensity. This presents an interesting result that open institutions may only be
beneficial at the frontier for economic development, while hindering development for
countries behind the frontier.
In column 1 of Table 3.12, I find a significant increase in night light intensity
for the areas of Western Europe and offshoots with a longer history of high polity2,
while outside of those areas a longer history of high polity2 significantly reduces night
light intensity. For Western Europe and offshoots, a 1% increase in years with high
polity2 increases night light intensity by 4.522%, while the same increase elsewhere in
the world reduces night light intensity by 0.678%. A similar pattern emerges for the
history of democracy and autocracy. Column 2 shows that a 1% increase in democracy
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years outside of the West is estimated to reduce night light intensity by 0.481%, while
the same increase in the West increases night light intensity by 4.354%. Again, in
column 3, this divergent institutional effect emerges. A longer history of autocracy
is estimated to reduce night light intensity in Western Europe and offshoots, where
a 1% increase in autoc years reduces night light intensity by 0.686%, while estimated
to increase night light intensity elsewhere around the globe, where a 1% increase in
autoc years increases night light intensity by 0.708%.
Over the next four columns, all but one of the subcomponents related to executive
recruitment and constraint present the same pattern of significantly increasing night
light intensity in Western Europe and offshoots, while reducing night light intensity
elsewhere. In column 4, a longer history of high xrreg is found to significantly
increase night light intensity in the West, where a 1% increase corresponds to a
2.641% increase, while reducing night light intensity outside the West, were a 1%
increase corresponds to a 0.304% decrease. The point estimate on a longer history of
high xrcomp is negative in column 5, but not statistically different from null outside
Western Europe and its offshoots. However, a longer history of high xrcomp is found
to significantly increase night light intensity for Western Europe and offshoots, where
a 1% increase leads to a 3.985% increase in night light intensity. In column 6, the
pattern reappears where a longer history of high xropen is found to increase night
light intensity in the West and reduce night light intensity elsewhere. A 1% increase
in years with high xropen is found to increase night light intensity by 4.68% in the
West, while the same increase is estimated to reduce night light intensity by 1.584%
in areas outside the West. I find the same pattern in column 7 for the history of high
xconst, where a 1% increase in years with high xconst reduces night light intensity
outside the West by 0.429% and increase night light intensity in the West by 3.584%.
The last two columns of Table 3.12 present similar results for political participation
and competition. In column 8, I find a longer history of political participation reduces
night light intensity outside the West, a 1% increase in high parreg years reduces light
intensity by 0.408%, and increases light intensity in the West, a 1% increase in high
parreg years increases light intensity by 1.027%. In column 9, the effect from a
longer history of political competition in Western Europe and offshoots is highest
in magnitude of all institutional histories. A 1% increase in high parcomp years
increases light intensity by 10.65% in Western Europe and offshoots, while the same
increase outside Western Europe and offshoots reduces light intensity by 1.555%.
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Table 3.12: Institutional History for Western Europe and Offshoots - IV Initial Institutions and Collapses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
History of polity2 -0.678***
(0.163)
West×History of polity2 5.200***
(0.408)
History of democ -0.481***
(0.122)
West×History of democ 4.835***
(0.414)
History of autoc 0.708***
(0.238)
West×History of autoc -1.382***
(0.244)
History of xrreg -0.304**
(0.124)
West×History of xrreg 2.945***
(0.479)
History of xrcomp -0.243
(0.362)
West×History of xrcomp 4.228***
(0.546)
History of xropen -1.584***
(0.338)
West×History of xropen 6.264***
(0.563)
History of xconst -0.429***
(0.118)
West×History of xconst 4.013***
(0.328)
History of parreg -0.408***
(0.125)
West×History of parreg 1.435***
(0.542)
History of parcomp -1.555***
(0.223)
West×History of parcomp 12.205***
(1.826)
Observations 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000 15258.000
Anderson LR-stat 892.250 574.651 3709.209 1273.564 808.431 875.334 941.241 1101.364 1041.683
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Additional covariates include indicators for Western Europe and offshoots, a local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indica-
tors for on coast, river, harbor, distance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and continental dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Modern Technological Frontier
Table 3.13 presents results similar to the previous table, although now the technolog-
ical frontier is now captured by an indicator OECD representing countries that are
currently members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Again, this indicator is found to be significant across all specifications and estimated
to reduce night light intensity for all except column 3. The interaction between
OECD and institutional history is estimated to increase night light intensity for all
except column 3 where again it is estimated to decrease night light intensity. This sug-
gests that whether considering the historical frontier of the Industrial Revolution or
the modern frontier of technological growth that more open political institutions are
beneficial for economic activity, while a hindrance for countries behind the frontier.
The results in Table 3.13 broadly mirror the results in Table 3.12 for the broad
indicators of open, democratic institutions. In column 1, I find a longer history
of high polity2 is estimated to reduce night light intensity in non-OECD countries,
where a 1% increase leads to 0.558% decrease in night light intensity. For OECD
countries, a 1% increase in the years with high polity2 is estimated to increase night
light intensity by 4.994%. These estimated effects are very similar in magnitude to
the previous table, suggesting that once the countries of East Asia, Eastern Europe,
and Latin America caught up to the technological frontier they benefited from more
open institutions. Column 2 shows that countries outside the OECD with a longer
history of high democ have significantly lower night light intensity, while OECD
countries benefit from a longer history of high democ. A 1% increase in high democ
years is estimated to decrease night light intensity by 0.397% outside the OECD and
increase night light intensity by 4.185%. This differential effect between countries on
and off the technological frontier also appears for the history of autoc. In column
3, a 1% increase in high autoc years is estimated to increase night light intensity by
0.547% outside the OECD, while reducing night light intensity by 0.659% in OECD
countries. This pattern remains similar among the subcomponents comprising the
broader indicators.
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Table 3.13: Institutional History for OECD - IV Initial Institutions and Collapses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
History of polity2 -0.558***
(0.153)
OECD ×History of polity2 5.004***
(0.401)
History of democ -0.397***
(0.115)
OECD ×History of democ 4.582***
(0.401)
History of autoc 0.547**
(0.216)
OECD ×History of autoc -1.206***
(0.222)
History of xrreg -0.225*
(0.123)
OECD ×History of xrreg 2.250***
(0.445)
History of xrcomp -0.198
(0.366)
OECD ×History of xrcomp 4.068***
(0.544)
History of xropen -1.409***
(0.336)
OECD ×History of xropen 5.913***
(0.549)
History of xconst -0.363***
(0.112)
OECD ×History of xconst 3.715***
(0.334)
History of parreg -0.347***
(0.124)
OECD ×History of parreg 0.957*
(0.491)
History of parcomp -1.456***
(0.223)
OECD ×History of parcomp 10.846***
(1.503)
Observations 15717.000 15588.000 15588.000 15588.000 15588.000 15588.000 15588.000 15588.000 15588.000
Anderson LR-stat 11310.397 9008.984 20040.652 10775.308 11720.593 3784.442 9771.282 8857.776 18452.003
p− value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Additional covariates include indicators for OECD countries, a local area’s biome, terrain ruggedness, elevation, malaria ecology, indicators for on coast,
river, harbor, distance to coast, river, harbor, or lake, and continental dummies. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Among the subcomponents related to executive succession and constraint, the
effects appear similar to the previous table. In column 4, the effect of a longer history
of high xrreg is now only marginally significant at reducing night light intensity,
where a 1% increase decreases night light intensity by 0.225%. For the countries
of the OECD, a longer history of xrreg significantly increases night light intensity,
where a 1% increase increases night light intensity by 2.025%. Again, for the history of
xrcomp, the point estimate is negative for countries not on the technological frontier
but not significantly different from null. For countries of the OECD, a 1% increase
in years with high xrcomp is estimated to increase night light intensity by 3.87%.
In column 6, the pattern reappears where a longer history of high xropen reduces
night light intensity outside the OECD, while increasing night light intensity in the
OECD. A 1% increase in years with high xropen is estimated to reduce night light
intensity by 1.409% outside the OECD and increase night light intensity by 4.504%
in the OECD. For executive constraint in column 7, I find the same pattern where a
1% increase in years high xconst reduces night light intensity by 0.363% outside the
OECD and increases night light intensity 3.352% in the OECD.
I find the same pattern for the subcomponents related to political participation
and competition. In column 8, a longer history of high parreg significantly reduces
night light intensity outside OECD countries, while only marginally significant in
increasing night light intensity for the OECD. A 1% increase in years with high
parreg is estimated to reduce night light intensity by 0.347% outside the OECD and
increase night light intensity by 0.61% in the OECD. For political competition, the
magnitude of the effect for countries along the technological frontier is quite large.
I find a 1% increase in years with high parcomp in the OECD increases night light
intensity by 9.39%, while outside the OECD the same increase reduces night light
intensity by 1.456%.
3.4 Conclusion
This essay finds that there is a large degree of persistence in institutions at a local
level around the globe. Using the persistence of institutions as a source of variation in
institutional history, I find that areas with a longer history of more open institutions
have higher concentrations of economic activity as measured by night light intensity.
The evidence suggests that this is driven by more open and competitive recruitment
of the executive and a higher degree of executive constraint rather than broad polit-
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ical participation and competition. Additionally, I find that this effect is driven by
countries along or near the technological frontier, while more open institutions are a
hindrance for laggards. Future research can work to uncover the mechanisms leading
to persistence of institutions at a local level and how the effect of institutions differs
for catch-up growth and innovation.
Copyright c© Andrew Jonelis, 2019.
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Chapter 4 The Effects of Democracy and Elections on Macroeconomic
Volatility
4.1 Introduction
Democratic institutions have been argued to reduce macroeconomic volatility through
multiple channels. The constitutions enshrining democracies provide strong institu-
tional constraints on their governments which provide low levels of volatility (Weede
(1996), Henisz (2000), Nooruddin (2003)). Policy setting in democracies comes
through consensus (Rodrik (1999), Mobarak (2001)) with diverse viewpoints taken
into consideration (Sah (1991)) limiting policy-driven volatility.
Empirical studies have confirmed that democratic institutions limit macroeco-
nomic volatility, although there are plain concerns about the endogeneity between
democratic institutions and macroeconomic volatility. Crises may motivate citizens
to push for institutional reform or solid economic performance is rewarded by citi-
zens. This endogenous relationship has been addressed by accounting for the legacy of
colonial institutions, where settler colonies with representative institutions have more
democratic institutions today leading to less volatility (Acemoglu et al. (2003)). To
address the endogeneity for a global sample, an indicator for Muslim majority coun-
tries is used for exogenous variation in democratic institutions (Mobarak (2005)).
While both colonial legacy and the history of Islam provide historical variation in
democratic institutions, neither will detect institutional change over the last fifty
years. Yang (2008) uses a dynamic panel to account for the potential institutional
change in recent history and finds a muted effect of democracy in the overall sample,
although democracy reduces volatility in highly ethnically fragmented societies.
Macroeconomic volatility has also been found to limit economic growth. This
empirical relationship has been well documented in both developing and developed
countries (Ramey and Ramey (1994)), although the negative effect of volatility on
growth may be worse for developing countries (Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004)). De-
veloping countries experience more volatility than developed countries because they
specialize in fewer and more volatile sectors (e.g. agriculture, mining, oil, etc.) than
industrialized countries (Koren and Tenreyro (2007)). Examining this relationship
with estimates of national accounts going back centuries, the evidence suggests high
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income countries today are richer than their peers not because of a faster average
growth rate, but because they experience fewer periods of economic decline (Broad-
berry and Wallis (2017)). This relationship of decline and long-run growth also holds
looking at all countries with national accounts over the last seventy years.
Macroeconomic volatility has been found to reduce self-reported happiness and
life satisfaction (Wolfers (2003)), thus voters in democracies punish governments that
do not deliver macroeconomic stability (Quinn and Woolley (2001)). This paper
examines this channel further by distinguishing between the effects of planned and
called elections. I follow the methodology of Yang (2008) by using a dynamic panel to
study the effect of democracy and elections on macroeconomic volatility. With this
methodology, I can account for the simultaneity between not only macroeconomic
volatility and democracy, but also volatility leading to more called elections due to a
collapse in government support or a new constitution introducing elections or altering
the timeline of elections.
The results confirm that democratic institutions mitigate macroeconomic volatil-
ity. Depending on the measure of macroeconomic volatility, the effect of democracy
is estimated at reducing volatility by one-half to nearly one and a half standard de-
viations. There is little evidence that planned or called elections have any significant
or differential effect on macroeconomic volatility after controlling for democracy. The
rest of the essay is organized as follows: section 4.2 describes the data and estimated
results and section 4.3 concludes.
4.2 Democracy and Elections Effects on Macroeconomic Volatility
In this essay, I examine three different measures of macroeconomic volatility: the
standard deviation in a country’s growth rate, the deviation from a country’s trend
growth rate, and the drop in GDP per capita. The most commonly used measure of
macroeconomic volatility is the standard deviation in economic growth rates over a
given period. Other studies have considered large drops in average income levels as a
measure of macroeconomic volatility. The final measure of macroeconomic volatility,
deviation from trend growth, is the deviation from the country’s growth rate predicted
by country fixed effects and a time trend. All of these variables are captured at a
five-year interval, providing an unbalanced panel with eight five year periods (1975
to 2014) for 157 countries.
These different measures of macroeconomic volatility are highly correlated with
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each pairwise correlation found to be statistically significant at a p < 0.01 level.
The strongest pairwise correlation is between drops in GDP per capita and deviation
from trend growth with a correlation coefficient of 0.658. Similarly, the pairwise
correlation between drops in GDP per capita and the standard deviation of a country’s
growth rate is quite high with a correlation coefficient of 0.627. The weakest pairwise
correlation is between the standard deviation of a country’s growth rate and the
deviation from trend growth with a correlation coefficient 0.224.
In this essay, I use polrights as a measure of democracy. This measure comes from
the Freedom House (2017) “Freedom in the World” rankings. polrights ranges from
a score of 1 with high political rights, free and fair elections, and a real opposition
to a score of 7 where there are no political rights due to severe government repres-
sion. This measure is available for more countries than the commonly used Polity
IV index (Marshall and Jaggers (2002)), but the results are robust to using either.
The two measures of democracy are highly correlated with the correlation found to
be statistically significant at a p < 0.01 level. The correlation is between the Polity
IV index and polrights at 0.9061. This is likely due to both measures capturing to a
large degree political participation and competition for political power. In this essay,
polrights is rescaled to range from 0 (least democratic) to 1 (most democratic).
This essay seeks to examine the effect, beyond democratic institutions, that elec-
tions have on macroeconomic volatility and whether there is a differential effect be-
tween planned elections, called elections, and close elections. Planned elections are
determined by the constitution of the country and are set to occur at a predetermined
date (e.g. every two years in the United States or after five years from the previous
election in Great Britain), while called elections are determined by current circum-
stances and can occur due to the introduction of a new constitution allowing elections,
a new constitution or law altering the timing of elections, or as in many cases elec-
tions held earlier or later than directly specified by the constitution. While planned
elections can be treated as exogenous to macroeconomic volatility, called elections
can not be treated as such. For example, during the oil embargoes by OPEC in the
1970s and the Great Recession, there are more called elections in Western Europe
than immediately before or after those periods. The use of a dynamic panel allows
me to address the endogeneity between called elections and macroeconomic volatility
and uncover whether called elections exacerbate or mitigate volatility compared to
planned elections.
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Figure 4.1: Volatility and Elections
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Figure 4.2: Volatility and Planned vs. Called Elections
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The figures below show how the distribution for the measures of macroeconomic
volatility vary with the number of elections. Figure 4.1 shows how the distribution of
macroeconomic volatility varies across the total number of elections. When there are
no elections, the interquartile range for both the standard deviation of growth rates
and output drops are higher than for when there are elections. For the deviation from
trend growth, there does not appear to be any difference between the interquartile
ranges as the number of elections increase. Additionally, for the standard deviation of
growth and output drops, the interquartile range seems to increases with the number
of elections.
Figure 4.2 splits elections between planned on the left and called on the right
across the different measures of macroeconomic volatility. An interesting pattern
emerges here. For both standard deviation of growth rates and output drops, the
interquartile range shrinks with the number of planned elections and rises with the
number of called elections. This provides suggestive evidence that called elections
may exacerbate macroeconomic volatility, while planned elections mitigate volatility.
For the deviation from growth trend, there does not appear to be any difference in the
interquartile ranges as planned or called elections increase, except for having three
called elections appears to have a higher interquartile range than two or less. These
patterns in the data will be tested using econometric techniques to account for the
simultaneity between called elections and macroeconomic volatility.
Dynamic Panel Estimates
The table below provides summary statistics for the variables used in this essay. The
mean standard deviation of growth rates over a five year period is 5.507 percentage
points. There is a good deal of dispersion in the distribution as its standard deviation
is 4.946 percentage points. The mean for actual growth below predicted by country
fixed effects and a time trend is -0.111 percentage points. This measure of volatility
also is quite dispersed with a standard deviation of 4.141 percentage points. The
mean for largest drop in GDP per capita over a five year period is 0.567 percentage
points, as most country-periods in the sample do not exhibit a sustained drop in
GDP per capita. The standard deviation of output drops is correspondingly small
at 1.443 percentage points. In fact, the 90 percentile for output drops is only 1.775
percentage points and the 95th percentile is only 2.97 percentage points. For the
measure of democracy, the mean of polrights is 0.542 with a standard deviation of
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0.349. Lastly, drawing focus to elections, there is 1.319 elections on average in a
country-period. The majority are planned elections, 0.819 per country-period, with
fewer called elections, 0.501 per period. All standard deviations for elections are
similar in magnitude from 0.688 for called elections, to 0.749 for planned elections,
up to 0.757 for total elections.
The other variables in the table have all been found to influence macroeconomic
volatility in previous research (Acemoglu et al. (2003), Mobarak (2005), Koren and
Tenreyro (2007), Yang (2008)). Both income levels and population size have been
found to reduce macroeconomic volatility. The inflation rate and government size
are two policy variables found to increase volatility. A large amount of credit to the
private sector increases the chance of financial crises, thus increasing volatility. Trade
openness has been found to increase volatility as countries are subject to more external
shocks. Similarly, over reliance on natural resources has been shown to increase
volatility as commodity prices vary on the global stage. Lastly, concentration, which
is a Herfindahl index of the agriculture, industry and manufacturing, and services
sectors rescaled to 0 (least concentrated) to 1 (most concentrated), has also been
shown to increase volatility by an economy focusing too much on one sector.
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Units N
Standard Deviation of Growth 5.507 4.946 Percentage points 925
Deviation from Trend Growth -0.111 4.141 Percentage points 925
Drop in GDP per capita 0.567 1.443 Percentage points 925
polrights 0.542 0.349 Index 0 to 1 897
Elections 1.319 0.757 Number 925
Planned elections 0.819 0.749 Number 925
Called elections 0.501 0.688 Number 925
Log initial income 8.571 1.207 Log 2005 US $ 925
Log population 15.678 1.909 Log 925
Inflation rate 2.821 5.836 Percent 925
Private Sector Credit 38.672 37.689 Percent of GDP 925
Government size 19.521 8.936 Percent of GDP 925
Trade 51.835 46.323 Percent of GDP 925
Resource Rents 7.512 10.308 Percent of GDP 925
Concentration 0.398 0.078 Index 0 to 1 925
Following Yang (2008), the dynamic panel model I estimate takes the following
form:
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yi,t = ρyi,t−1 + δDi,t + ηEi,t + β
′Xi,t + ui + εi,t
where yi,t is one of the measures of macroeconomic volatility described above, Di,t
is one of the democracy variables described above, Xi,t is a conditioning set of vari-
ables found to be correlated with macroeconomic volatility in previous research, ui is
the unobserved country-specific effects, and εi,t is an iid error term. The persistence
of macroeconomic volatility is captured by ρ, while δ measures the short-run effect of
democracy with its long-run effect given by δ/(1 − ρ). By taking first differences, we
can eliminate the unobserved country specific effects driving macroeconomic volatil-
ity:
∆yi,t = ρ∆yi,t−1 + δ∆Di,t + η∆Ei,t + β
′∆Xi,t + ∆εi,t
Still, the lagged difference in macroeconomic volatility is correlated with the er-
ror term and democracy, along with the conditioning variables, is likely endogenous.
Arellano and Bond (1991) introduce a generalized method of moments (GMM) to
identify this equation with the assumptions that the error term is not serially corre-
lated and lagged levels of the endogenous variables are not correlated with leading
error terms. This allows the use of lagged levels of the endogenous variables as instru-
ments for current differences. Additionally, Blundell and Bond (1998) show for small
t panels that efficiency can be increased by using lagged differences as instruments for
levels. This essay uses this type of system GMM where both lagged levels are used
to instrument for current differences and lagged differences are used to instrument
for current levels. To limit instrument proliferation, only the second and third lags
are used to instrument for current differences which in most specifications follows the
rule of thumb given in Roodman (2009) that the number of instruments should be
limited to the number of panels. At the bottom of the following tables, the p-values
for tests of autocorrelation between the first and second error terms and the Hansen
test of whether the lagged instruments are correlated with contemporaneous error
terms. I do not find any evidence that the assumptions underlying this system GMM
estimator are violated.
Table 4.2 shows the results from estimating the above equation using system
GMM with the second and third lags used as instruments in all specifications. The
primary result from this paper is to confirm that democracy significantly reduces
macroeconomic volatility. Across all columns of Table 4.2, I find the coefficient on
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polrights to be negative and statistically significant. However, controlling for the
level of polrights, I do not find any significant effect from the number of elections
on macroeconomic volatility. There is also no evidence in Table 4.2 that planned
or called elections have a significant differential effect on macroeconomic volatility.
In column 1, the estimated effect of moving from the lowest to highest polrights
is 6.19 percentage point reduction in the standard deviation of a country’s growth
rate. This is an economically large effect as the mean standard deviation is 5.507
percentage points. The magnitude of the effect of increasing polrights is somewhat
larger in column 2 when separating elections between planned and called but quite
similar to column 1. In column 3, the estimated effect of going from zero to full
polrights is found to reduce the deviation from a country’s trend growth rate by
2.406 percentage points, slightly over half of the sample standard deviation. When
splitting elections between planned and called in column 4, the magnitude of the effect
of polrights is somewhat diminished and only marginally statistically significant. In
column 5, increasing polrights from the lowest to the highest value is estimated
to reduce the drop in GDP per capita a country experiences by 1.642 percentage
points. Controlling for any differential effect between planned and called elections
in column 6, the estimated effect of polrights is somewhat smaller but still found to
significantly reduce volatility. Across all three measures, increasing polrights is found
to significantly reduce macroeconomic volatility. Unlike Yang (2008), I do not find
that ethnolinguistic fractionalization matters for the effect of democracy on volatility
as I have a larger set of countries in my sample and a longer time period.
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Table 4.2: Democracy, Elections, and Macroeconomic Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measure of volatility Standard Deviation Deviation from Trend Output Drop
L.volatility 0.035 0.061 0.209*** 0.215*** 0.213** 0.222***
(0.057) (0.056) (0.074) (0.068) (0.083) (0.079)
polrights -6.190*** -6.501*** -2.406** -2.128* -1.642*** -1.351***
(1.273) (1.433) (1.035) (1.134) (0.355) (0.394)
Elections 0.427 -0.362 -0.214
(0.710) (0.516) (0.260)
Planned Elections 0.794 -0.617 -0.388
(0.714) (0.706) (0.251)
Called Elections 0.253 -0.154 -0.047
(1.007) (0.692) (0.351)
Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833
Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157
Instruments 154 154 154 154 154 154
AR(1) 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.006
AR(2) 0.588 0.438 0.919 0.965 0.301 0.293
Hansen 0.420 0.391 0.316 0.364 0.477 0.380
Additional covariates include initial income level, population, inflation rate, a concentration index
for agriculture, industry and manufacturing, and services, government consumption, natural re-
source rents, private sector credit, and trade as a share of GDP, . Robust standard errors reported
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
In Table 4.3, I include an indicator for presidential regimes to account for any
potential differential effect of elections between presidential and parliamentary forms
of government. In general, elections in presidential systems will occur at planned
intervals, while parliamentary systems may choose to opportunistically call elections
when popular support for the government is high (Balke (1990), Smith (1996)). The
primary result from Table 4.2 still holds throughout Table 4.3, in that increasing
polrights is found to significantly reduce macroeconomic volatility. Now controlling
for presidential regime and interacting with elections, I find some limited evidence
that more elections may reduce macroeconomic volatility, although I still do not find
a consistent, significant differential effect of planned and called elections.
75
Table 4.3: Presidential vs. Parliamentary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Measure of volatility Standard Deviation (Deviation from Trend Output Drop
L.volatility 0.036 0.030 0.080 0.189** 0.204*** 0.181*** 0.211*** 0.202*** 0.211***
(0.052) (0.056) (0.052) (0.076) (0.066) (0.068) (0.078) (0.066) (0.069)
polrights -5.905*** -6.313*** -4.958*** -2.306** -2.236** -1.848** -1.613*** -1.416*** -1.295***
(1.211) (1.341) (1.135) (0.990) (0.991) (0.935) (0.352) (0.361) (0.324)
Elections 0.823 -0.093 -0.122 -1.247* -0.490 -0.875 -0.067 -0.136 -0.384*
(0.706) (0.820) (0.532) (0.708) (0.524) (0.562) (0.222) (0.299) (0.216)
Presidential 1.450 0.100 0.472 -2.129 0.328 -1.017 -0.022 -0.065 -0.253
(1.799) (1.169) (0.884) (1.546) (1.437) (0.661) (0.587) (0.438) (0.236)
Pres. × Elections -0.656 1.332 -0.140
(1.149) (0.891) (0.383)
Planned Elections 0.568 0.306 -0.052
(0.763) (0.846) (0.283)
Pres. × Planned Elections -0.192 -0.794 -0.216
(0.911) (1.105) (0.374)
Called Elections 1.179 -0.812 0.213
(0.872) (0.791) (0.202)
Pres. × Called Elections -1.592 1.798* 0.014
(1.390) (0.989) (0.259)
Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833 833 833 833
Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
Instruments 188 188 205 188 188 205 188 188 205
AR(1) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.005
AR(2) 0.532 0.459 0.281 0.841 0.945 0.688 0.320 0.306 0.325
Hansen 0.980 0.912 0.994 0.940 0.903 0.995 0.935 0.933 0.992
Additional covariates include initial income level, population, inflation rate, a concentration index for agriculture, industry and manufacturing, and
services, government consumption, natural resource rents, private sector credit, and trade as a share of GDP, . Robust standard errors reported in
the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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In column 1 of Table 4.3, the estimated effect of moving from zero to full polrights
is a 5.905 percentage point increase in the standard deviation of a country’s growth
rate. The magnitude of the effect is somewhat higher in column 2 when controlling for
planned elections at a 6.313 percentage point reduction in the standard deviation of
a country’s growth rate when increasing polrights from the lowest to highest possible
value. I control for called elections in the next column and the effect of polrights
is rather diminished so the same increase from zero to full polrights is estimated to
decrease the standard deviation of a country’s growth rate by 4.958 percentage points.
All of these estimated effects are in line with the results in Table 4.2. Although not
statistically significant in any of the first three columns, the estimated effect of more
elections is negative in columns 2 and 3.
Across the next three columns, polrights is still found to significantly reduce
macroeconomic volatility, now measured as deviation from trend growth. In column
4 of Table 4.3, the estimated effect of increasing polrights from the lowest to highest
value is a 2.306 percentage point reduction in a country’s deviation from its trend
growth rate. I also find that for each election the deviation from a country’s trend
growth is reduced by 1.247 percentage points, although only marginally significant at
the 10% level. The next column finds a similar effect of increasing polrights where
moving from zero to full is estimated to reduce a country’s deviation from its trend
growth by 2.236 percentage points. While more elections are estimated to reduce
volatility, the effect is no longer found to be significant at standard levels in column
5. Controlling for called elections in column 6, an increase to full polrights is es-
timated to reduce the deviation from a country’s trend growth by 1.848 percentage
points. I find that more called elections in presidential regimes increase macroeco-
nomic volatility, where for each additional there is an estimated 1.798 percentage
point increase in a country’s deviation from trend growth.
The last three columns of Table 4.3 find that greater polrights significantly reduce
macroeconomic volatility measured by output drops. In column 7, an increase from
zero to full polrights is found to reduce the size of output drops by 1.613 percentage
points, quite close to the estimate from Table 4.2. Controlling for planned election
in column 8, the estimated effect of polrights is somewhat smaller in magnitude
at a 1.416 percentage point smaller drop in output when moving from the lowest to
highest polrights. I find that this effect is even smaller in magnitude when controlling
for called elections in column 9 where an increase to maximum polrights is found
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to reduce the drop in output by 1.295 percentage points. Also, in column 9, the
estimated effect of more elections is found to be significant in reducing drops in
output, although only a the 10% level. For each additional election, the drop in
output is estimated to be 0.384 percentage points smaller.
Table 4.4 considers whether close elections have any differential effect on macroe-
conomic volatility. I define a close election as when the share of seats held by the
party of the president or president both before and after the election falls within a
certain range. For the most restrictive definition, this range is only between 50% and
55% of the legislature, but I also vary the range to 48% to 57% and 45% to 60%.
There is not strong evidence that close elections have a strong effect on macroeco-
nomic volatility. The lack of any effect also holds when defining close election based
on the share of seats held by the president or prime minister’s party and their allies
in the legislature.
Across Table 4.4, I confirm the main result of this paper in that increasing
polrights reduces macroeconomic volatility. In column 1 of Table 4.4, moving from
zero to full polrights is estimated to decrease a the standard deviation of a country’s
growth rate by 5.944 percentage points. This estimated effect is in line with the
previous two tables. The estimated effect of polrights increases in magnitude when
I expand the definition of close elections in column 2. Increasing polrights from the
lowest to highest value is estimated to reduce the standard deviation of a country’s
growth rate by 6.208 percentage points. When I allow for the broadest definition of
close election in column 3, the estimated effect of polrights is nearly identical to col-
umn 2 at a 6.184 percentage point decrease in the standard deviation of a country’s
growth rate when moving from zero to full polrights.
Over the next three columns, I measure macroeconomic volatility as deviation
from trend growth and continue to find polrights reduces volatility, although the
effect is only significant at standard levels in column 6. Additionally, the estimated
effect is relatively smaller in magnitude than previous tables. In column 4, increasing
to full polrights from its lowest value is estimated to reduce a country’s deviation
from trend growth by 1.598 percentage points, but the standard error is over one
percentage point rendering the estimate insignificant at standard levels. The effect of
polrights is even smaller in magnitude in column 5 at only a 1.369 percentage point
reduction in the deviation from trend growth when going from zero to full polrights,
but again the estimate is not significant at standard levels. However, I find that close
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elections are estimated to significantly reduce volatility in column 5. For each close
election, there is an estimated 0.928 percentage point reduction in deviation from a
country’s trend growth. It is interesting that while close elections are estimated to
reduce growth across columns 4 through 6, only column 5 finds this effect significant.
For column 6, I find the effect of polrights marginally significant in reducing the
deviation from a country’s trend growth. Increasing polrights to the highest value
from lowest is estimated to reduce the deviation from a country’s trend growth by
1.765 percentage points.
The last three columns of Table 4.4 measure macroeconomic volatility with output
drops and the estimated effects of polrights are in line with the previous tables.
Additionally, I find across the last three columns that planned elections significantly
reduce the size of output drops. In column 7, an increase from zero to full polrights
is estimated to reduce the size of output drops by 1.268 percentage points. For
each planned election, the same column estimates that there is a 0.423 percentage
point smaller drop in output. These estimated effects are similar across the last
two columns. An increase to the highest polrights from the lowest is estimated to
reduce the drop in output by 1.258 and 1.261 percentage points in columns 8 and 9,
respectively. Each planned election is estimated to reduce the size of output drops
by 0.351 and 0.349 percentage points in columns 8 and 9, respectively.
In Table 4.5, I examine whether there is a differential effect of close elections
in presidential and parliamentary regimes. The main result that increased polrights
reduces macroeconomic volatility holds. I do not find evidence to support there is any
differential effect between close elections in presidential and parliamentary regimes.
There is also mixed evidence as to whether called elections increases or decreases
macroeconomic volatility depending on the measure of volatility.
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Table 4.4: Close Elections
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Measure of volatility Standard Deviation Deviation from Trend Output Drop
L.volatility 0.080 0.072 0.067 0.203*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.239*** 0.226*** 0.225***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.067) (0.066) (0.064) (0.073) (0.077) (0.078)
polrights -5.944*** -6.208*** -6.184*** -1.598 -1.369 -1.765* -1.268*** -1.258*** -1.261***
(1.309) (1.357) (1.380) (1.062) (1.095) (1.068) (0.369) (0.372) (0.376)
Planned Elections 0.517 0.808 0.599 -0.632 -0.633 -0.501 -0.423** -0.351* -0.349*
(0.644) (0.641) (0.658) (0.581) (0.561) (0.606) (0.214) (0.185) (0.179)
Called Elections 0.305 0.366 0.253 -0.004 -0.207 -0.134 -0.021 -0.056 -0.050
(0.931) (0.904) (0.867) (0.593) (0.581) (0.576) (0.304) (0.293) (0.265)
Close Elections (50-55%) 0.438 -0.708 0.195
(0.525) (0.516) (0.160)
Close Elections (48-57%) 0.059 -0.928** -0.028
(0.506) (0.423) (0.154)
Close Elections (45-60%) 0.178 -0.786 -0.075
(0.619) (0.643) (0.170)
Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833 833 833 833
Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
Instruments 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171
AR(1) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.006
AR(2) 0.329 0.424 0.445 0.979 0.911 0.996 0.316 0.296 0.285
Hansen 0.830 0.812 0.691 0.661 0.660 0.652 0.792 0.792 0.747
Additional covariates include initial income level, population, inflation rate, a concentration index for agriculture, industry and manufacturing, and services, govern-
ment consumption, natural resource rents, private sector credit, and trade as a share of GDP, . Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Across the first three columns of Table 4.5, I continue to find that increase
polrights reduces the standard deviation of a country’s growth rate. Additionally,
more called elections are estimated to increase the standard deviation of a country’s
growth rate. In column 1, moving from zero to full polrights is estimated to reduce
the standard deviation of a country’s growth rate by 5.104 percentage points. The
same column estimates that each additional called election raises the standard devi-
ation of a country’s growth rate by 2 percentage points. The following two columns
show similar estimates as I vary the definition of close elections. The estimated effect
of increasing polrights from the lowest to highest value is a reduction in the standard
deviation of growth by 5.475 and 5.494 percentage points in columns 2 and 3, respec-
tively. Each additional called election is estimated to increase the standard deviation
of growth by 1.721 and 1.688 percentage points in columns 2 and 3, respectively.
Over the next three columns, I measure volatility with the deviation from trend
growth. Across all three columns, polrights is estimated to reduce macroeconomic
volatility, although only marginally significant in column 6 and not significant at
standard levels in columns 4 and 5. Also, rather than increasing volatility, called
elections are estimated to reduce the deviation from trend growth at marginally sig-
nificant levels in columns 5 and 6. I find limited evidence that presidential regimes
experience smaller deviations from trend growth and called elections in presidential
regimes increase the deviation from trend growth. In column 4, an increase to full
polrights from the lowest level is estimated to reduce the deviation from trend growth
by 1.427 percentage points. In the same column, called elections in parliamentary sys-
tems reduce the deviation from trend growth by 1.199 percentage points, while called
elections in presidential systems would increase the deviation from trend growth by
0.284 percentage points. The estimates in columns 5 and 6 are quite similar to those
in column 4. In column 5, an increase to full polrights is estimated to reduce the
deviation from trend growth by 1.447 percentage points. The same column shows
that the estimated effect of called elections in parliamentary systems is a reduction
from the deviation of trend growth by 1.266 percentage points, but for presidential
systems called elections raise the deviation from trend growth by 0.315 percentage
points. The effect of polrights is somewhat higher in column 6 at a 1.809 percentage
point reduction in the deviation from trend growth for full polrights. Called elec-
tions are estimated to reduce by 1.271 percentage points in parliamentary systems
and increase by 0.316 percentage points in presidential systems.
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Table 4.5: Close Elections in Presidential vs. Parliamentary
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Measure of volatility Standard Deviation (Deviation from Trend Output Drop
L.volatility 0.101* 0.094* 0.088* 0.186*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 0.233*** 0.226*** 0.225***
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.069) (0.067) (0.063) (0.074) (0.076) (0.079)
polrights -5.104*** -5.475*** -5.494*** -1.427 -1.447 -1.809* -1.237*** -1.346*** -1.331***
(1.247) (1.262) (1.284) (0.902) (0.977) (1.001) (0.345) (0.361) (0.369)
Presidential 0.722 0.598 1.060 -1.303* -1.511* -1.550 -0.012 -0.102 -0.020
(0.968) (1.012) (1.173) (0.711) (0.787) (1.000) (0.241) (0.277) (0.354)
Planned Elections 0.507 0.637 0.461 -0.649 -0.530 -0.439 -0.289 -0.214 -0.220
(0.554) (0.529) (0.529) (0.560) (0.491) (0.492) (0.195) (0.155) (0.149)
Called Elections 2.000** 1.721** 1.688* -1.199 -1.266* -1.271* -0.051 -0.052 -0.044
(0.956) (0.862) (0.873) (0.830) (0.708) (0.659) (0.226) (0.200) (0.200)
Pres. × Called Elections -2.257 -2.034 -1.989 1.550 1.581* 1.587* -0.069 -0.114 -0.100
(1.585) (1.434) (1.424) (1.003) (0.913) (0.896) (0.325) (0.310) (0.303)
Close Elections (50-55%) -0.707 -1.190 0.191
(0.734) (0.778) (0.208)
Pres. × Close Elections (50-55%) 1.150 1.062 -0.097
(1.047) (0.961) (0.255)
Close Elections (48-57%) -0.490 -1.097** -0.039
(0.582) (0.523) (0.137)
Pres. × Close Elections (48-57%) 0.770 0.323 0.002
(0.851) (0.693) (0.228)
Close Elections (45-60%) 0.260 -1.255 0.017
(0.762) (1.027) (0.189)
Pres. × Close Elections (45-60%) -0.221 0.910 -0.138
(1.102) (1.252) (0.391)
Observations 833 833 833 833 833 833 833 833 833
Countries 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
Instruments 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
AR(1) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.007
AR(2) 0.253 0.305 0.313 0.730 0.824 0.680 0.327 0.328 0.300
Hansen 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999
Additional covariates include initial income level, population, inflation rate, a concentration index for agriculture, industry and manufacturing, and
services, government consumption, natural resource rents, private sector credit, and trade as a share of GDP, . Robust standard errors reported
in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Over the last three columns of Table 4.5, I measure macroeconomic volatility with
output drops. Again, this confirms the main results of the essay in that polrights
reduce macroeconomic volatility. In column 7, an increase from zero to full polrights
is estimated to reduce the output drop by 1.237 percentage points. Over the next
two columns, the same increase in polrights is estimated to reduce the output drop
by 1.346 and 1.331 percentage points. I do not find any evidence that called or closed
elections significantly reduce output drops.
4.3 Conclusion
This essay confirms that democracy reduces macroeconomic volatility in a larger
sample of countries. The statistical significance of this relationship holds across mul-
tiple measures of macroeconomic volatility. An increase in political rights is found
to reduce the standard deviation of growth rates, deviations from trend growth, and
significant drops in output, which has been argued to be key for long-term growth and
development (Broadberry and Wallis, 2017). There is not substantial evidence that
planned or called elections have a significant or differential effect on macroeconomic
volatility, nor do I find consistent evidence of any effect from close elections.
Copyright c© Andrew Jonelis, 2019.
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